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• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Through this action, William Compton, John Simcox, and Saltair Investments, 
L.L.C. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") seek to obtain coverage for a $1,000,000 judgment that 
falls outside the plain and unambiguous scope of coverage provided by a professional 
liability insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed this civil action and appeal against Houston 
Casualty Company ("HC") based on HC's denial of coverage for non-party Robert 
Seegmiller ("Seegmiller") with regard to a claim made under a professional liability 
policy HC previously issued to Seegmiller's former employer, non-party Utah County 
Real Estate, LLC ("Prudential"). Plaintiffs bring this claim against HC as Seegmiller's 
assignees and judgment creditors, but their standing does not change the fact that there is 
no coverage available under the applicable insurance policy because Seegmiller acted 
outside the scope of his covered profession and his conduct is not otherwise covered 
under the plain and unambiguous terms of the policy. As such, this Court should uphold 
Judge Maughan's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of HC. 
I. PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING LAWSUIT 
Approximately ten years ago, Plaintiffs invested over $1 million dollars into two 
of Seegmiller's personal real estate development projects, one in Highland, Utah and the 
other in Herriman, Utah. Plaintiffs later learned that Seegmiller made material 
misrepresentations to induce Plaintiffs to invest, which included Seegmiller's failure to 
disclose his personal interest in both transactions. Plaintiffs subsequently filed two 
lawsuits, one for each project, to get their money back. This case stems from an 
5 
underlying judgment in Civil No. 070916209, which relates to Seegmiller' s project in 
Herriman, Utah ("Herriman Litigation"). 1 
In the Herriman Litigation, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against two of 
Seegmiller' s co-defendants, Sterling Barnes ("Barnes") and Valley View, L.L.C. 
("Valley View"), on April 28, 2011 2 because the undisputed evidence showed that Barnes 
and Valley View stole Plaintiffs' investment into the project and used the funds to pay 
kickbacks to, among others, Seegmiller. Days later, Plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment against Seegmiller because the undisputed evidence showed that Seegmiller 
had a personal interest in the real estate deal and Seegmiller failed to disclose his conflict 
of interest to Plaintiffs. 
On October 18, 2011, Judge Toomey granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs' 
favor with respect to their claim for theft against Barnes and Valley View and their claim 
for negligence against Seegmiller. (A copy of Judge Toomey's decision is attached as 
Addendum Exhibit 1.) With regard to Plaintiffs ' claim against Seegmiller, Judge 
Toomey found that Seegmiller "owed certain duties to the Plaintiffs, which he breached 
by failing to clarify his role in the transaction and failing to disclose a personal interest in 
the transaction." On June 7, 2012, Judge Toomey, based on her October 11, 2011 
decision, entered a judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Seegmiller for 
$1,041,275.34. 
1 Civil No. 070916208 relates to Seegmiller' s project in Highland, Utah ("Highland 
Litigation") and is not at issue in this appeal. 










II . SEEGMILLER SETTLES WITH PLAINTIFFS 
On May 29, 2013, Seegmiller entered into a settlement with Plaintiffs. As part of 
that deal, Seegmiller assigned to Plaintiffs his alleged claims against ( 1) the other 
defendants in the Herriman Litigation, (2) Prudential's insurance carriers (including HC), 
and (3) Defendants Dan McDonald ("McDonald") and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC ("Smith 
Hartvigsen").3 In exchange, Plaintiffs promised to eventually dismiss the remaining 
charges against Seegmiller in the Herriman Litigation, which include causes of action for 
fraud, theft, conspiracy, and negligent misrepresentation. To HC's knowledge, however, 
those claims remain pending to this day. 
III. THE PRESENT ACTION 
On September 13, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the present civil action against McDonald 
and Smith Hartvigsen. On or about July 29, 2014, Judge Maughan granted Plaintiffs 
leave to amend their Complaint, name HC as a Defendant, and allege a cause of action 
for breach of contract against HC; Plaintiffs' claim against HC is based on HC's decision 
to deny Seegmiller coverage for the Highland and Herriman Litigation under Prudential's 
professional liability policy.4 
HC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 31, 2015 and Plaintiffs filed 
a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on April 3, 2015. Judge Maughan held a hearing 
on the Motions on August 13, 2015. Judge Maughan subsequently GRANTED HC's 
3 Plaintiffs' claims against McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen do not relate to Plaintiffs' 
claim against HC. As such, HC will not address them in this brief. 
4 As noted above, coverage for the Highland Litigation is not at issue here. 
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Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and DENIED Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (A copy of Judge Maughan's decision is attached as Addendum 
Exhibit 2.) Judge Maughan found for HC because, under the applicable professional 
liability insurance policy, I-IC "agreed to provide insurance coverage to Prudential, and its 
real estate agents while providing Professional Services ' on behalf of Prudential, ' solely 
in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, 
for others for a fee."' Judge Maughan found that " [b ]ecause Robert Seegmiller had a 
personal interest [in the Herriman Transaction], he held dual or competing roles in the 
transaction giving rise to the Herriman Lawsuit. Robert Seegmiller cannot have held dual 
or competing roles in the transaction and simultaneously have acted 'solely' as Plaintiffs' 
real estate agent 'on behalf of Prudential." Judge Maughan also held that Plaintiffs, as 
judgment creditors, cannot "obtain greater coverage than the HC[] Policies provide for 
Robert Seegmiller." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTIONS 
This case stems from Plaintiffs' investment of over $1 million into two real estate 
development projects approximately ten years ago, one in Highland, Utah ("Highland 
Transaction") and the other in Herriman, Utah ("Herriman Transaction"). There is no 
dispute that Seegmiller introduced Plaintiffs to both projects and, at the time, was a 
Prudential real estate agent. (R. 2586-87; 2776- 77, ,i,i 2-8; 2783-84, ,i,i 2-8; 2790, ,i 5.) 
Apart from his work for Prudential, however, Seegmiller was also a property owner, 







Seegmiller's and Plaintiffs' testimony, demonstrates that the Highland and Herriman 
Transactions were two of Seegmiller's personal real estate projects. (R. 2617; 2625-27; 
2635-36; 2807, ~ 5.) 
The idea behind the Highland Transaction was that Plaintiffs, through a limited 
liability company, would create a new development by purchasing a large piece of 
property, subdividing it into lots, and selling off the individual lots. (R. 2588-89; 2596.) 
Seegmiller stood to personally profit from the deal in a number of ways. First, 
Seegmiller joined the limited liability company Plaintiffs formed to purchase the 
property. (R. 2590; 2598.) In addition, and unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Seegmiller was a 
member of a second, secret limited liability company that used Plaintiffs' down payment 
to purchase the property at a lower price and "flip" it to Plaintiffs for a profit; that is, 
Seegmiller had an ownership interest in the property on both sides of the transaction. 
(R. 2596-97; 2623; 2631.) Given his self-interest, Seegmiller never told Plaintiffs about 
his "flipping" limited liability company intermediary. (R. 2596-97.) Instead, he told 
Plaintiffs that they were purchasing the property directly from "farmers." (R. 2586; 
2589; 2596-97 .) Seegmiller's unlawful conduct in the Highland Transaction is the 
subject of the Highland Litigation, which remains ongoing. Plaintiffs are not seeking 
coverage for the Highland Litigation through this appeal. 
With respect to the Herriman Transaction, Plaintiffs agreed to purchase forty-
seven lots from Valley View for $225,000 per lot under the belief that they "were 
purchasing them at a price that it would allow those lots to then in tum be sold for a 
profit." (R. 2593, p. 58:4-10. See also R. 2593-95; 2982-2989.) Plaintiffs paid Valley 
9 
View a $705,000 "refundable" deposit and agreed to pay the remainder of the purchase 
price when the lots were developed and ready to be sold. The deal, however, never 
closed because Valley View did not develop the lots. (R. 2594; 2603; 2607; 2982-89.) 
When Plaintiffs demanded their deposit back due to Valley View's failure to develop the 
lots, Valley View refused. (R. 2603.) Plaintiffs later learned that Valley View used 
Plaintiffs' deposit to, among other things, buy the property for itself and pay off parties 
who worked for Valley View. For example, Seegmiller received $165,000 for bringing 
Plaintiffs' money into the deal and providing other management, development, and 
• 
• 
consulting services to Valley View, Barnes, and their developer, Maxwell Real Estate • 
Development ("Maxwell"). (R. 2602-03; 2606; 2625; 2662; 5038-39.) 
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs never acquired the Herriman lots and did not 
know about Seegmiller' s relationship with Valley View, Barnes, and Maxwell when they 
put their $705,000 into escrow. In Plaintiffs' own words, their decision to deposit the 
funds was "a result of the fraud of Barnes and Seegmiller .... " (R. 2881, ~ 74. See also 
R. 2594; 2603; 2982- 89.) 
II. THE UNDERLYING LAWSUITS 
In November 2007, Plaintiffs filed two lawsuits to get back the money they 
invested in the Highland and Herriman Transactions: Civil Nos. 070916208 and 
070916209 (i.e. the Highland and Herriman Litigation). (R. 2815- 38.) Plaintiffs served 
Seegmiller, who they named as a defendant in both lawsuits, with copies of the 
Complaints on December 1, 2007. (R. 3089- 90.) Among others, Plaintiffs also named 





McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen initially represented both Seegmiller and 
Prudential in the Highland and Herriman Litigations. (R. 2619; 3197, ~ 19.) Early on, 
Seegmiller, Bruce Tucker, the owner and CEO of Prudential, and McDonald discussed 
whether to submit the Claim5 to HC, Prudential 's professional liability insurance carrier. 
At Seegmiller's insistence, they did not submit the Claim. (R. 2669; 2792-98, ~~ 12-34; 
3230.) 
Seegmiller was adamant that Prudential not submit the Claim to HC for several 
reasons. First, Seegmiller acknowledged the Highland and Herriman Transactions were 
his personal real estate deals. (R. 2807, ~ 5.) Seegmiller worked on the Highland and 
Herriman Transactions as a property owner, developer, manager and consultant; not as a 
Prudential real estate agent. (R. 2617; 2625-27; 2635-36; 2807, ~ 5.) In addition, and in 
Seegmiller's own words, " there was no commissionable event." (R. 2625-26, pp. 65 :23-
66: 10.) Indeed, neither Seegmiller nor Prudential received a commission in connection 
with either deal. (R. 2596; 2625-26; 2632; 5038-39.) Recognizing the Highland and 
Herriman Transactions were his personal deals, Seegmiller actually volunteered to pay 
for Prudential's defense because " this was [his] mess that [he] created and [he] wanted to 
make sure that" Tucker and Prudential were not harmed. (R. 2659-60, pp. 373:21-374:3. 
See also R. 2650; 2793-94, ~~ 15, 18; 3231.) Seegmiller and Prudential consequently 
5 While there are two separate lawsuits, HC treated the Highland and Herriman 
Litigation as a single Claim because, under the terms of the Policy, "[ o ]ne or more 
Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Act or interrelated Wrongful Acts 
by one or more of the Insureds shall be considered a single Claim." (R. 2719, Section 
VI(b ).) 
11 
defended the lawsuits themselves for more than two years before finally giving HC notice 
of the Claim. During that same time period, they omitted any reference to the lawsuits 
from policy renewal applications. (R. 2742; 2773; 2888-90; 5689.) 
On January 21 , 2010, McDonald, on Prudential ' s and Seegmiller's behalf, finally 
notified HC of the Highland and Herriman Litigation. (R. 2888-90.) In the notice to HC, 
McDonald confirmed the Highland and Herriman lawsuits included allegations that 
Seegmiller was a principal in both deals and "part of a conspiracy that fraudulently 
induced" Plaintiffs to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars. (R. 2888-90.) 
On March 23, 2010, HC sent Prudential and Seegmiller its coverage position 
letter, informed them that there was no coverage for the Highland or Herriman Litigation 
under Prudential's professional liability policy, and reserved its right to deny coverage, as 
the facts may warrant, on grounds other than those specifically set forth in its initial 
coverage position letter. (R. 2892-2900.) HC also invited Prudential and Seegmiller to 
provide any additional information that may be relevant to HC' s coverage analysis; 
neither of them did. (R. 2892-2900.) 
After HC confirmed there was no coverage, Seegmiller asked McDonald to write 
"a letter to [Mr. Roundy] letting him know [Prudential and Seegmiller] were denied 
coverage based on the fact there was no representation" of Plaintiffs in connection with 
the Highland and Herriman Transactions. (R. 2643, p. 169:1-13. See also R. 3186-88.) 
Months later, Seegmiller similarly instructed Judson Pitts, who succeeded McDonald as 






having no insurance and no money to cover a judgment." (R. 2644-45, pp. 176:4-
177: l l. SeealsoR. 3190-92.) 
III. THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT 
On May 9, 2011, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment with respect to their 
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy claims against Seegmiller in the 
Herriman Lawsuit. Days earlier, Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment with 
respect to their theft, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims against 
Barnes and Valley View. (R. 2902-17.) 
On October 18, 2011, Judge Toomey issued her decision on Plaintiffs' motions for 
summary judgment. She granted Plaintiffs summary judgment with respect to their 
negligence claim against Seegmiller and held that regardless of whether Seegmiller acted 
as Plaintiffs' real estate agent during the Herriman Transaction, which she detennined 
was a question of fact, Seegmiller "owed certain duties to Plaintiffs, which he breached 
by failing to clarify his role in the transaction, and failing to disclose a personal interest 
in the transaction." (R. 2909-11 (emphasis added).) Judge Toomey also awarded 
summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor with respect to their theft claim against Barnes and 
Valley View. (R. 2911-13.) She held that Plaintiffs "demonstrated sufficient evidence to 
prove the elements of theft. Mr. [Barnes] and Valley View unlawfully took the earnest 
money, depriving the Plaintiffs of their property." (R. 2911- 13.)6 
6 To HC's knowledge, Plaintiffs' fraud, theft, conspiracy, and negligent 
misrepresentation claims against Seegmiller remain pending. (R. 2865-86; 2902- 17 .) 
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Following Judge Toomey's ruling, Plaintiffs threatened to pursue their remaining 
claims against Seegmiller unless he assigned his alleged claims against, among others, 
HC to them. For example, on April 17, 2012, Mr. Roundy wrote Mr. Pitts a letter and 
stated: 
If I pursue the negligence judgment against the E&O Policy 
and Mr. Seegmiller's former attorneys, then the judgment will 
never be more than a negligence judgment. 
*** 
On the other hand, if that strategy fails to result in a complete 
recovery for my clients, they will have no other option but to 
proceed to trial. At trial, I will obtain judgments against Mr. 
Seegmiller for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Those 
judgments will not be eligible for insurance coverage. . . . 
This case will never end for Mr. Seegmiller unless he 
reaches a settlement with us that prevents our claims 
against him from going to trial. 
(R. 2961-62 ( emphasis added).) 
On June 7, 2012, Judge Toomey, based on her October 11, 2011, decision, entered 
a judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Seegmiller in the amount of $1 ,041,275.34. 
The judgment consists of (1) $705,000, which reflects the exact amount Plaintiffs placed 
into escrow to "hold the lots" in the Herriman Transaction, and (2) $336,275.34 in 
interest. (R. 2594; 2603; 2920-21; 2982-89.) 
IV. THE UNDERLYING SETTLEMENT 
Seegmiller subsequently entered into a settlement with Plaintiffs on May 29, 2013. 
Under the terms of the settlement, Seegmiller assigned Plaintiffs his alleged claims 
against ( 1) the other defendants in the Herriman Litigation, (2) McDonald and Smith 






the prosecution of [their] [ c ]laims by providing all reasonably requested assistance[.]" 
(R. 2968-69.) In his own words, Seegmiller needed to placate Plaintiffs because he is 
"not paying ajudgment against [him] plain and simple." (R. 2638, pp. 133:10-134:15.) 
V. THE POLICY 
HC issued the relevant Professional Liability Errors & Omissions Insurance 
Policy, Policy No. H707-16865 ("Policy" or "2007 Policy"), to Prudential with effective 
dates of November 26, 2007 to November 26, 2008. (R. 2715 (a copy of the Policy is 
attached as Addendum Exhibit 3).) Under the Policy's Insuring Clause, HC agreed to: 
pay on behalf of the Insured any Loss and Claim Expense in 
excess of the Deductible amount and subject to the Limit of 
Liability as the Insured acting in the profession described in 
Item 3 of the Declarations shall become legally obligated to 
pay for Claim or Claims first made against the Insured during 
the Policy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an 
Insured provided always that the Insured has no knowledge of 
such Wrongful Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy 
and further provided that such Wrongful Act took place 
subsequent to the Retroactive Date set forth in Item 8 of the 
Declarations. 
(R. 2716, Section I.) 
The Policy defines an Insured as, among other things, " [a]ny partner, executive 
officer, director or employee of the Named Insured while acting within the scope of their 
duties on behalf of the Named Insured[.]" (R. 2716, Section II(b).) Independent 
contractors are also covered under the Policy, "but only if the Professional Services of the 
Independent Contractor(s) are the same as those set forth in Item 3 of the Declarations 
Page and in Endorsement No. 1 ofth[e] Policy." (R. 2730.) 
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The Policy is a professional liability policy. It clearly and unambiguously defines 
the covered profession/professional services as (those) "[s]olely in the perfonnance of 
services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee." 
(R. 2715- 16; 2724.) Similarly, the Policy excludes coverage for "any claim [or] claim 
expenses arising out of or connected with the performance of or failure to perform 
services as an insurance agent, insurance broker, mortgage banker, mortgage broker, 
escrow agent, property developer, builder, construction manager, or property manager" as 
well as "any claim [or] claim expenses arising out of or connected with any transaction in 
which any Insured has a direct or indirect beneficial ownership interest as a buyer or 
seller of real property .. .. " (R. 2727- 28.) 
Regardless of whether an Insured was acting within the scope of the covered 
) 
profession, the Policy excludes coverage for any Claim or Claim Expense " [b ]ased upon 
or arising out of any dishonest, criminal, fraudulent, malicious or intentional Wrongful 
Acts, errors or omissions committed by or at the direction of the Insured." (R. 2717, 
Section IV(a).) 
In the event of a Claim, the Policy requires Insureds to "immediately forward to 
the firm named in Item 6 of the Declarations every demand, notice, summons or other 
process received by the Insured or his representative." (R. 2720, Section VIII(a)(2).) 
In addition to the 2007 Policy, HC also issued Prudential professional liability 
policies in 2006 and 2008. Those policies contain the same material provisions as those 
found m the 2007 Policy, including Insuring Clauses, definitions of 




SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm Judge Maughan's decision to grant HC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment because the undisputed facts show that Seegmiller was not acting 
within the scope of his covered profession during the Herriman Transaction; thus, there is 
no coverage under the Policy. The Policy, through its plain and unambiguous terms, only 
provides coverage for Prudential real estate agents while they are acting "solely" as real 
estate agents/brokers "on behalf of' Prudential and "for a fee." There is no dispute that 
Seegmiller held an undisclosed, personal interest in the Herriman Transaction and 
received a $165,000 kickback from stolen funds in exchange for his work as a consultant, 
developer, and property manager on behalf of Valley View, Barnes, and Maxwell. That 
is, as Judge Maughan held, Seegmiller did not "act[] 'solely' as Plaintiffs' real estate 
agent 'on behalf of' Prudential" and thus did not act within the scope of the profession 
covered by Prudential's Policy. 
Even if this Court is not persuaded that Seegmiller' s personal interest in the 
Herriman Transaction took him outside the scope of the covered profession as a matter of 
law, this Court should nevertheless affirm Judge Maughan's decision to grant summary 
judgment in favor of HC on alternative grounds. 
This Court may affirm Judge Maughan's decision because the undisputed 
evidence shows that Seegmiller' s self-dealing was not the type of conduct Prudential and 
HC intended to cover under the plain terms of the Policy's Insuring Clause. In addition 
to only providing coverage for individuals acting "solely" as real estate agents/brokers, 
the Policy also only provides coverage for real estate agents acting "on behalf of' 
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Prudential who receive or expect to receive a "fee." There is no question that the 
Herriman Transaction was Seegmiller's personal deal; Prudential was never going to 
receive any fees from the proposed, failed transaction. That is, it cannot be said 
Seegmiller participated in the deal "on behalf of' Prudential. Similarly, Seegmiller 
simply did not receive or expect to receive the type of professional "fee" necessary to 
trigger coverage. Prudential insurance agents are paid one way: by commission. It is 
undisputed that P laintiffs never paid and never intended to pay Seegmiller a commission 
in connection with the Herriman Transaction. It is also undisputed that the only payment 
Seegmiller received or expected to receive in connection with the Herriman Transaction 
was his $165,000 kickback, paid out of Plaintiffs' stolen funds. That secret payoff is not 
the type of "fee" that triggers coverage under the Policy. Because Seegmiller's conduct 
is not covered under the Policy's Insuring Clause, there is no coverage. 
In addition, the Court may uphold Judge Maughan's decision because the Policy 
excludes coverage for dishonest acts, and Plaintiffs' Claim and judgment are based on 
Seegmiller's deceitful conduct. While Plaintiffs argue there must be coverage because 
they have a judgment against Seegmiller for "negligence," this Court should follow the 
long-held principal that the underlying facts, not the title of the legal theory applied, 
determine whether coverage exists. When this Court reviews the undisputed facts, 
including Plaintiffs' own testimony, it will become apparent that Seegmiller acted 
dishonestly, which negates any coverage available under the Policy. 
Finally, this Court may uphold Judge Maughan's decision because Seegmiller 




Seegmiller and Prudential withheld notice of the Claim from HC for years, did not 
disclose the litigation on policy renewal applications, and never challenged HC's decision 
to deny coverage. Given such actions, Seegmiller would be barred from seeking 
coverage now under the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. As Plaintiffs stand m 
Seegmiller's shoes, they similarly cannot recover under the Policy at this late date. 
HC does not challenge Plaintiffs' standing to bring this action as either judgment 
creditors or Seegmiller' s assignees. Whether Plaintiffs stand before this Court as 
judgment creditors or assignees, however, is irrelevant. Simply put, Plaintiffs cannot 
obtain greater coverage than would otherwise be available to Seegmiller. Judge Toomey 
specifically found that whether Seegmiller was even acting as Plaintiffs' real estate agent 
during the Herriman Transaction is a question of fact, negating any possibility that 
coverage exists as a matter of law. More importantly, and for the reasons discussed 
above and addressed more fully below, the undisputed facts actually reveal there is no 
coverage available for Seegmiller under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy as 
a matter of law. As such, Plaintiffs cannot use the Policy to fund their underlying 
judgment. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm Judge Maughan's decision to grant 
summary judgment in favor ofHC. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE 2007 POLICY APPLIES. 
The 2007 Policy applies because the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs did 
not serve Seegmiller with copies of the Complaints in the Highland and Herriman 
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Litigation until December 2007. The three professional liability policies HC issued to 
Prudential (in 2006, 2007, and 2008) are "claims made" policies. As such, the date 
Plaintiffs made their Claim against Seegmiller controls which policy applies. AOK 
Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1993). Under the 
policies, a Claim is defined as "a demand received by the Insured for compensation of 
damages, including the service of suit .... " (R. 2717 ( emphasis added).) Plaintiffs have 
offered no evidence to show Seegmiller received a demand prior to November 26, 2007. 
Rather, Plaintiffs admit that Seegmiller was served with copies of the Complaints on 
December 1, 2007. As such, the 2007 Policy applies. 
The question of which policy applies, however, is essentially a non-issue because 
Prudential's three HC professional liability policies contain the same material provisions. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE POLICY TO EFFECTUATE 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES. 
A. The Policy's terms are plain and unambiguous. 
This Court should interpret the Policy according to its plain and unambiguous 
terms. HC agrees with Plaintiffs that " [w]hen interpreting an insurance contract, the 
Court must read the policy as a whole and attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of 
its provisions." (Plaintiffs' Br., p. 35.) HC also agrees that " [a] construction which 
contradicts the general purpose of the contract or results in hardship or absurdity is 
presumed to be unintended by the parties." (Id. at p. 34.) Indeed, words should be 
interpreted "' according to their usually accepted meaning and in light of the insurance 
policy as a whole."' Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App 295, ,i 11 , 
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362 P.3d 909 (quoting Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, ~ 5, 980 P.2d 
685). "'If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language."' 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unigardins. Co., 2012 UT 1, ~ 16,268 P.3d 180 (quoting Benjamin 
v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, ~ 14, 140 P.3d 1210). 
Given these basic principles of policy construction, this Court should disregard 
Plaintiffs ' call to interpret the Policy " in a way that provides the most broad potential 
coverage to Prudential and Seegmiller that the Policy will allow by its interpretation." 
(Plaintiffs' Br., p. 36.) Such a request, on its face, actually begs the Court to ignore Utah 
law and distort the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Policy. Notably, Plaintiffs 
have never alleged that any Policy provisions or terms are ambiguous or provided a legal 
basis for construing the Policy according to anything other than its plain and 
unambiguous terms. Those terms reveal the true intent of the parties and must be 
honored. 
B. The Policy does not provide coverage for Prudential's real estate 
agents' personal real estate deals. 
Judge Maughan properly granted HC's Motion for Summary Judgment because 
the undisputed evidence shows that Seegmiller's conduct in the Herriman Transaction is 
not covered under the Policy's Insuring Clause. In an insurance coverage dispute, the 
insured has the burden to prove it suffered a loss covered by the policy's insuring or 
coverage provision. Young v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 2008 UT App 114, ~~ 25-28, 182 P.3d 
21 
911; Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 500 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1972). Here, the 
Policy' s Insuring Clause provides coverage when the: 
Insured acting in the profession described in Item 3 of the 
Declarations shall become legally obligated to pay for Claim 
or Claims first made against the Insured during the Policy 
Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured provided 
always that the Insured has no knowledge of such Wrongful 
Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy .... 
The Insuring Clause incorporates several definitions by reference that further • 
clarify the scope of coverage available, including, most importantly, the definition of the 
Insured's Profession, as found in Item 3 of the Declarations Page, which refers to 
Endorsement 1. Endorsement 1 identifies the Insured's Profession, the only profession 
for which the Policy provides coverage, as "[ s ]olely in the performance of services as a 
Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee." That is, the 
performance of any non-covered professional services, including property management, 
development, and consulting, takes an individual outside the scope of the covered 
profession because (s)he is not acting exclusively as a Prudential real estate agent or 
broker. The same holds true if an individual does not receive or expect to receive a 
professional "fee" or holds an ownership interest in the property.7 Simply put, an 
individual is not covered under the Policy unless (s)he "checks off' each of the specific 
criteria that define the covered profession. See Walston v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh., Pa., Nos. 3:09-CV-112-AC, 3:10-CV-579-AC, 3:10-CV-6126-AC, 2012 WL 
7 As discussed above, it is undisputed that Seegmiller held an ownership interest in the 
Herriman property. Plaintiffs are not seeking coverage for the Highland Transaction in 
this appeal. 
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2049451, at * 19 (D. Or. June 6, 2012) (" [T]he specific language of the Endorsement 
limits coverage to [Investment Advisor Representatives] only when they are acting solely 
in their capacity as an [Investment Advisor Representative] and then provides a specific 
definition for [Investment Advisor Representative] that requires those [Investment 
Advisor Representatives] to meet other requirements established by State Farm."); Hirani 
Eng'g & Land Surveying v. Mehar Inv. Grp. LLC, No. 09-252-RGA, 20 12 WL 917566, 
at *l (D. Del. March 19, 2012) ("Were there no limitations on the term 'Professional 
Services,' it would appear that the work of a professional engineer or environmental 
• engineer would fall within the ordinary understanding of the term. Since the contract 
narrowed the definition of 'Professional Services, ' it is necessary to consider what the 
contract covered with the more limited definition."). 
As discussed more fully below, the undisputed facts show that Seegmiller (1) did 
not act "solely" as a real estate agent during the Herriman Transaction, if at all, (2) did 
not act "on behalf of' Prudential, and (3) did not receive a "fee." As such, and pursuant 
to the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy, there is no coverage. 
Ill SEEGMILLER HELD A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE HERRIMAN 
TRANSACTION. 
This Court should affirm Judge Maughan's ruling that Seegmiller's personal 
interest in the Herriman Transaction negates any potential for coverage under the Policy 
because it took him outside the scope of the covered profession. The Policy's plain and 
unambiguous terms, including its specific definition of the covered profession, establish 
the criteria an individual must meet to be covered under the Policy. If an individual does 
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not meet the criteria, there is simply no coverage available. See Walston, 2012 WL 
2049451, at *19; Hirani, 2012 WL 917566, at *1. 
The policy language and facts in Walston are particularly helpful in demonstrating 
how a professional liability policy may refine the scope of coverage provided through the 
use of a specific definition of the covered profession. In Walston, the plaintiffs were 
underlying judgment creditors ("Garnishors") who obtained limited judgments against a 
State Farm agent (McCoy) for "negligence" based on representations McCoy made to get 
the Garnishors to invest in a real estate development company, Willamette Development 
Services, LLC. Walston, at * 1-5. After obtaining their judgments, the Garnish ors 
brought suit against McCoy's State Farm professional liability insurer (National Union), 
alleging their damages were "based on claims that McCoy was negligent with respect to 
investment advice she gave them and that McCoy's conduct f[ell] within the terms of the 
Policy." Id. at *7. There was no dispute that McCoy was, at all relevant times, employed 
as a State Farm agent and certified to sell State Farm securities. Id. at *3. Willamette, 
however, was one of McCoy's "outside business activities." That is, her brother started 
the company, she received compensation dfrectly from Willamette for services she 
provided, and Willamette investment documents revealed McCoy held an ownership 
interest in the company. Id. at *4-5. Thus, the question before the Court was whether 
the express terms of State Farm's professional liability policy provided coverage for 
McCoy's personal ventures. 
Like Prudential's Policy, the State Farm professional liability policy at issue in 





coverage for "Wrongful Act[s] committed by [an] Investment Adviser Representative 
solely while acting in his/her capacity as such." Id. at *7 (emphasis added).8 The Court 
determined the policy was clear and unambiguous, providing that "an IAR must be acting 
exclusively on behalf of, and for the benefit of, State Farm to be covered by the [p]olicy." 
Id. at *22. Given the clear language of the policy, the Court found there was no coverage 
for the Garnishors ' underlying judgments because "McCoy was acting on behalf of, and 
for Willamette in promoting and recommending that Gamishors invest in Willamette. 
Even if, as Garnishors argue, McCoy was also soliciting potential clients for her State 
Farm business, that secondary purpose does not change that McCoy was working for 
Willamette at all times in question, and primarily so." Id. That is, the Court found that 
McCoy was acting outside the scope of the profession covered by the express terms of 
the State Farm policy while working for Willamette, even if there was some potential 
benefit to State Farm. 
Prudential's Policy only provides coverage for Insureds "solely in the performance 
of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee." 
If an individual is not acting "solely" as a real estate agent/broker, (s)he is not acting 
within the covered profession. The term "solely" means "to the exclusion of all else." 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solely (last visited 
8 The State Farm policy also specifically defined the term "Investment Adviser 
Representative" ("IAR"). Id. at *7-8. 
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Apr. 12, 2016).9 Its synonyms include: exclusively, just, and only. Id. See also Plank-
Greer v. Tannerite Sports, LLC, 102 F.Supp.3d 954, 957 (N.D. Ohio 2015) ("The term 
'only' modifies the phrase 'with respect to the conduct of the business,' thereby expressly 
limiting the insured's coverage to conduct that relates solely to the insured's business. 
Activities that are mixed in nature-done for both business and pleasure-or activities 
unrelated to the business, are outside the policy's scope."). Thus, as in Walston, the 
Policy provides no coverage for Seegmiller's personal business pursuits, even when there 
was some theoretical, tangential benefit to Prudential. 
The undisputed facts show that Seegmiller did not participate in the Hen-iman 
Transaction "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent. Seegmiller himself admits the 
Hen-iman Transaction was his personal real estate deal; he worked on the deal as a 
property developer, manager, and consultant and received a $165,000 kickback for his 
efforts, which was taken out of Plaintiffs' stolen funds. Plaintiffs similarly acknowledge 
that Seegmiller held a personal interest in the Hen-iman . Transaction. Indeed, 
Seegmiller's secret, personal alliance with Valley View, Barnes, and Maxwell was the 
basis of Plaintiffs' underlying suit, and Plaintiffs have continuously emphasized that they 
wish they had known Seegmiller had a conflict of interest and "was being paid a large 
undisclosed fee ... for bringing [them] and [their] money to the transaction" prior to 
placing their deposit. (R. 2779, ~ 23; 2786, ~ 23.) Judge Toomey found Seegmiller was 
9 Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App 295, ~ 11, 362 P.3d 909 ("As we 
would for contract language, we 'interpret words in insurance policies according to their 




liable for Plaintiffs' losses because he "fail[ ed] to clarify his role in the transaction, and 
fail[ ed] to disclose a personal interest in the transaction." (R. 2909-11.) In short, 
everyone acknowledges Seegmiller held a personal interest in the Herriman Transaction. 
As it cannot be said that Seegmiller acted "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent, if at 
all, Seegmiller was not acting within the Policy's covered profession. That means there 
is no coverage under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy. 
This Court should reject Plaintiffs' plea to read the Policy as providing coverage 
for acts that are "unrelated to the covered activity for which the insurance policy was 
purchased." (Plaintiffs' Br., p. 37.) As an initial matter, such a construction would ignore 
the clear language of the Policy, which unambiguously defines the scope of the covered 
profession (i.e. "solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker ... 
. "). See Walston, 2012 WL 2049451 at * 19 ("It would be objectively unreasonable to 
construe the language of the Policy, and the Endorsement, to provide coverage for IARs 
no matter who they are representing or benefitting. "); Plank-Greer, 102 F .Supp.3d at 
957. Moreover, Plaintiffs provide no support, in law or fact, to support such a broad 
construction. There is no evidence to suggest either Prudential or HC intended to provide 
coverage for Prudential's real estate agents when they were pursuing their personal 
interests, and the only cases Plaintiffs cite are inapplicable. The policies in TM v. Exec. 
Risk Indem. Inc. and Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Nat 'l Union Fire Ins. Co. used the word 
"solely" to define Wrongful Acts - neither policy used the term to define the scope of the 
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covered profession. 10 In addition, the insureds in TM and Jarvis argued the policies' 
definitions of "Wrongful Act" were ambiguous. 59 P.3d 721, 725 (Wyo. 2002); 197 F.3d 
742, 751 (5th Cir. 1999). 11 Plaintiffs have never alleged that any provision of the Policy, 
let alone the definition of the covered profession, is ambiguous. Indeed, its terms are 
clear and reveal Prudential's real estate agents are not covered if they have a personal 
interest in a transaction because they cannot be acting "solely" as real estate agents on 
behalf of Prudential in such situations. Thus, Seegmiller's personal interest in the 
Herriman Transaction, which is at the heart of Plaintiffs ' Claim and judgment, negates 
any potential for coverage 
IV. THE COURT MAY AFFIRM JUDGE MAUGHAN'S DECISION ON 
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS. 
Even if this Court is not persuaded that Seegmiller's undisputed personal interest 
in the Herriman Transaction entitles HC to judgment as a matter of law, this Court should 
affirm Judge Maughan's decision on one of several alternative grounds. 
A. Seegmiller's conduct is not covered under the Policy's Insuring Clause. 
1. Seegmiller did not act "on behalf or' Prudential. 
The Policy provides no coverage for the Herriman Transaction because Seegmiller 
did not act "on behalf of' Prudential. Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, Seegmiller's 
10 The Court in Walston specifically found the policies in TM and Jarvis were "easily 
distinguishable" because the policies in those cases used the term "solely" in their 
definitions of "Wrongful Act" and not to define the scope of the covered professions. 
Walston, 2012 WL 2049451 at *20. 
11 The policy in TM did not even define the covered profession ("psychologist"). 59 
P.3d at 723, 725. 
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status as a Prudential employee/independent contractor12 does not automatically make 
him an Insured. Rather, Seegmiller was only insured under the Policy when acting "on 
behalf of' Prudential. (R. 2716, Section II(b).) That is, there is no coverage if the Claim 
relates to work Seegmiller performed to further his own self-interests. Walston, 2012 
WL 2049451 at *22 (finding there could be no coverage unless the alleged Wrongful Act 
was committed by the individual while acting "exclusively, ,on behalf of, and for the 
benefit of' the named insured). See also Berry & Murphy, P. C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. 
Co., 586 F.3d 803, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2009); Farr v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 61 
F.3d 677, 681 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he proper inquiry is whether Farr and Markley 
were acting on behalf of the corporation (as opposed to themselves) when they engaged 
in the alleged behavior.") ( emphasis added). Given the plain language of the Policy and 
relevant case law, Plaintiffs' contention that "the coverage provision requires coverage 
for any negligence committed by Seegmiller when acting within the real estate 
profession"13 is misplaced. For example, Plaintiffs would not argue the Policy provides 
coverage if Seegmiller performed services as a real estate agent for another brokerage. 
12 Seegmiller's status as an employee or independent contractor is irrelevant with respect 
to the coverage analysis since employees and independent contractors are subject to the 
same Insuring Clause, definitions (including the definition of the covered profession), 
and exclusions. (R. 2730 ("It is further understood and agreed that the Independent 
Contractors, of the "Named Insured", are covered solely for their Professional Services 
provided on behalf of the Insured; but only if the Professional Services of the 
Independent Contractor(s) are the same as those set forth in Item 3 of the Declarations 
Page and in Endorsement No. 1 of this Policy.").) As such, HC will not address whether 
Seegmiller is more properly classified as a Prudential employee or independent 
contractor. 
13 (Plaintiffs' Br., p. 41.) 
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Similarly, by its plain and unambiguous terms, the Policy provides no coverage for 
Seegmiller's personal deals. 
The undisputed evidence shows that Seegmiller did not participate in the Herriman 
Transaction "on behalf of' Prudential. Again, Seegmiller's admissions are telling: he 
testified that he acted solely in the role of developer and not as a Prudential agent. 
(R. 2627-28, pp. 76:21-77:7.) It is also undisputed that because the Herriman 
Transaction was Seegmiller' s personal real estate deal, neither Seegmiller nor Prudential 
ever entered into a service contract with Plaintiffs or received a commission in 
connection with the proposed deal. Prudential's name is also noticeably absent from the 
relevant Real Estate Purchase Contract, and it was Barnes, not Seegmiller, who placed 
Seegmiller's name on that document. (R. 2982-89; 5037.)14 Seegmiller volunteered to 
pay for Prudential's defense in the Herriman Litigation and requested that McDonald 
withhold notice of the Claim from HC for a reason, and it was certainly not because 
Seegmiller wanted to be personally liable for a $1 million ju_dgment. (R. 2659-60, 
pp. 373:21-374:3. See also R. 2650; 2793-94, ,, 15, 18; 3231.) Rather, Seegmiller 
recognized the Herriman Transaction was his personal deal and he should take 
14 Barnes told Plaintiffs ' counsel that Seegmiller: 
wasn't making any commission on it there was no commission on 
that transaction I think I was the one who ended up writing his 
name on the REPC and my agent's name on the REPC just because 
I thought you had to have somebody in each of those spots but 
neither of those agents were actually making any commission in the 
transaction it was just a document that they provided for us. 








responsibility. Because it was Seegmiller's personal deal, there is no coverage under the 
Policy. 
2. Seegmiller did not receive or expect to receive a "fee" that would 
trigger coverage under the Policy. 
Barnes and Valley View stole Plaintiffs ' money, and Seegmiller' s receipt of a 
$165,000 kickback from those stolen funds cannot trigger coverage under the Policy. 
The parties agree that the Policy provides no coverage unless Seegmiller received or 
expected to receive a "fee" in connection with the Herriman Transaction. As the term 
"fee" is not defined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which is " [a] 
charge for labor or services, especially professional services." Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. 
Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App 295, ~ 11, 362 P.3d 909 ("As we would for contract 
language, we 'interpret words in insurance policies according to their usually accepted 
meanings and in light of the insurance policy as a whole"') ( citations omitted); BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 309 (4th pocket ed. 2011). Plaintiffs cite no authority to suggest the 
term "fee" is ambiguous or that it should be defined in any other way. 
Several undisputed facts reveal Seegmiller did not receive or expect to receive a 
"fee" in the Herriman Transaction that would trigger coverage. First, Prudential 
insurance agents are paid in one way: by commission. (R. 2993, ~ 13; 3022.) Second, 
Seegmiller and Barnes agree that Seegmiller's $165,000 payment was not a commission. 
(R. 2625-26; 2632; 5038-39.) Barnes emphasized that fact in a conversation with 
Plaintiffs' counsel: 
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Barnes: I didn't think there was an agent there was no 
commission as far as someone representing someone and 
getting paid there wasn't anybody 
Roundy: Right you knew that because you would have been 
the one paying the commission as the seller so you weren't 
Barnes: Yeah 
Roundy: As far as what his relationship was with Bill 
[Compton] and John [Simcox] did you have an impression 
one way or the other about .whether he was representing them 
or why was he involved in the communication if he wasn't 
acting in some role on their behalf 
Barnes: Well I didn't think he was their agent no and I 
understood he was going to get some management fees from 
the management company for putting the deal together but 
nothing beyond that no agent buyer relationship. 
(R. 5038-39 (emphasis added).) Third, Seegmiller never received or expected to receive 
a commission from Plaintiffs, his alleged clients, in connection with the Herriman 
Transaction. Fourth, no portion of Seegmiller's $165,000 kickback went to Prudential. 15 
Fifth, Seegmiller's kickback was paid out of stolen funds. (R. 2911-13.) Finally, the 
illegal nature of Seegmiller' s kickback was the basis of Plaintiffs' underlying lawsuit and 
judgment. Given these facts, Seegmiller simply never received or expected to receive a 
professional "fee" for services he allegedly provided Plaintiffs. 
This Court should reject Plaintiffs' argument that Seegmiller's $165,000 kickback 
is the type of professional "fee" that triggers coverage under the Policy. In an effort to 
15 Under Utah law, real estate commissions belong to the brokerage (i.e. Prudential). 
UTAH ADMIN CODE R. 162-2f-40la(15)(b). So, even if the $165,000 payment to 
Seegmiller could be classified as a "commission," which HC refutes, it was unlawful for 








create coverage where none exists, Plaintiffs now contend Seegmiller received his payout 
in accordance with common real estate practices. (Plaintiffs ' Br., p. 38.) That position, 
however, directly contradicts Plaintiffs' prior statements and arguments. In addition to 
the facts discussed above, Plaintiffs' own testimony evidences the fact that Seegmiller's 
kickback was anything but common, as they stated that " [i]t would have ... been very 
material for [them] to know that Mr. Seegmiller was being paid a large undisclosed fee 
by Valley View for bringing [them] and [their] money to the transaction .... " (R. 2779, 
~ 23; 2786, ~ 23.) Judge Toomey agreed when she held that Seegmiller was liable for 
"failing to clarify his role in the [Herriman] [T]ransaction, and failing to disclose a 
personal interest in the transaction." (R. 2909-11.) Even Plaintiffs' counsel admits that 
Seegmiller's "secret commission" was not a standard real estate commission. (R. 7547, 
p. 94: 12-23 16 ("That's one of the reasons why I think Judge Toomey was concerned that 
there was non-disclosure, because it wasn't paid in the traditional course of where the 
closing takes place then from the money that the seller received at the closing table, he 
takes a part of that money and pays the agent a commission.").) Indeed, "common," 
lawful payments cannot serve as the basis for a $1 million judgment. 
There is no escaping the fact that Seegmiller received a large, undisclosed, illegal 
kickback from stolen funds for getting Plaintiffs to invest with Barnes, Valley View, and 
Maxwell. This Court should avoid any policy construction that rewards and encourages 
16 Mr. Roundy first used the term "secret commission" to describe Mr. Seegmiller's 
$165,000 kickback at the August 13, 2015 hearing on the parties' Motions for Summary 
Judgment. 
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such deceptive, unlawful behavior and find there is no coverage because such an illegal 
payment does not satisfy the Policy's "fee" requirement. 
B. Seegmiller acted dishonestly. 
Even if Seegmiller's unlawful conduct was covered under the Policy's Insuring 
Clause, which HC refutes, the Policy provides no coverage for the Herriman Litigation, 
including Plaintiffs' judgment, because Seegmiller acted dishonestly. The Policy 
excludes coverage for any Claim or Claim Expenses " [b ]ased upon or arising out of any 
dishonest, criminal, fraudulent, malicious or intentional Wrongful Acts, enors or 
omissions committed by or at the direction of the insured."17 (R. 2717, Section IV(a).) 
Plaintiffs will likely contend the exclusion is inapplicable because they strategically 
obtained summary judgment against Seegmiller in the Heniman Litigation with respect 
to their "negligence" claim only. The facts, however, not Plaintiffs' legal theory, control 
whether coverage exists. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985) ("In 
applying the policy's exclusion to the insured's conduct, the emphasis should be placed 
upon the alleged activities or omissions of the insured which give rise to the claim and 
not upon the claimant's characterizations of her legal theories of liability."); 9 COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 126:3 (3d ed. 2014) ("[T]he legal theory asserted by the claimant is 
17 As the insurer, HC has the burden to prove the applicability of any exclusion. Quaker 
State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278, 1312 (D. Utah 







immaterial to the determination of whether the risk is covered."). 18 When this Court 
examines the undisputed facts, it will be clear that Seegmiller's deceitful conduct and 
misrepresentations to Plaintiffs, which Seegmiller used to induce Plaintiffs into investing 
in the Highland and Herriman Transactions, are the basis of Plaintiffs' Claim and 
judgment. 19 Indeed, the undisputed facts reveal that Seegmiller's purposeful, dishonest 
conduct negates coverage. 
The record is replete with undisputed evidence of Seegmiller's dishonest conduct. 
For example, in the Herriman Litigation, Plaintiffs presented the following statements of 
fact: 
• "The conduct of Robert Seegmiller did not meet industry standards for 
treating the plaintiffs honestly, regardless of whether or not he was 
representing them." 
• "The conduct of Robert Seegmiller did not meet industry standards that 
prohibited Seegmiller from doing anything that would mislead plaintiffs .. 
" 
• "The conduct of Robert Seegmiller did not meet industry standard [sic] of 
full disclosure, which obligated [Seegmiller] to tell [Plaintiffs] all material 
information which [Seegmiller] leam[ed] about the property or the seller's 
ability to perform his obligations." 
18 It is also important to note that under Utah law, dishonest representations, like 
Seegmiller's, " 'are considered purposeful rather than accidental for the purpose of 
insurance coverage. The underlying rationale of this rule is that negligent 
misrepresentation requires intent to induce reliance and, therefore, is a subspecies or 
variety of fraud which is excluded from policy coverage."' Nova Cas. Co. v. Able 
Constr. Co., 1999 UT 69,, 16, 983 P.2d 575 (quoting Dyksta v. Foremost Ins. Co., 17 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 545 (Cal Ct. App. 1993)). 
19 Plaintiffs' passing references to Prudential 's alleged failure to properly supervise 
Seegmiller are not at issue as Plaintiffs never obtained a judgment against Prudential and 
Prudential never assigned Plaintiffs the right to pursue any claims on Prudential's behalf. 
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• The Herriman Transaction was a "dishonest ... flip[,]" and Seegmiller 
withheld infonnation about the "dishonest" nature of the transaction from 
Plaintiffs. 
(R. 3133-34, ~~ 27, 28, 31; 2779, ~ 23; 2786, ~ 23 (emphasis added).) That is, in 
Plaintiffs' own words, Seegmiller lied to them to get them to invest in his personal real 
estate deals. Judge Toomey agreed, and consequently found Seegmiller liable for 
''failing to disclose a personal interest in the transaction." (R. 2909-11 ( emphasis 
added).) Since Seegmiller's dishonest conduct provides the basis for Plaintiffs' lawsuit 
and judgment against Seegmiller, the Policy excludes coverage. 
HC expects Plaintiffs may again attempt to argue that Seegmiller's 
misrepresentations were the product of an honest mistake. Plaintiffs first made that 
argument while briefing the underlying Motions for Summary Judgment when faced with 
the cold truth that the Policy excludes coverage for dishonest acts. (R. 5009.) If 
Plaintiffs revisit the argument, this Cami should reject their new-found classification of 
Seegmiller's conduct. For starters, it is a self-serving argument that cuts against the 
evidence and sworn statements Plaintiffs used to secure their underlying judgment in the 
Herriman Litigation. See Fowler v. Mark McDougal & Assocs., 2015 UT App 194, ~ 6, 
357 P.3d 5 (a party cannot contradict a prior statement without a clear explanation for the 
discrepancy). It also calls for the Court to ignore Plaintiffs' promise to "obtain 
judgments against Mr. Seegmiller for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud" at trial if 
Plaintiffs are unable to collect from HC; it is notable that, to HC's knowledge, those 
claims remain pending. (R. 2961- 62.) Plaintiffs obtained their underlying judgment by 








legal theory in an effort to circumvent Policy exclusions, controls whether coverage 
exists. As the Policy provides no coverage for Seegmiller's dishonest conduct, Plaintiffs 
cannot use the Policy to fund their judgment. 
C. Seegmiller disclaimed any right to coverage. 
Seegmiller's decision to actively disclaim coverage for years negates any potential 
for coverage under the Policy now. Whether Plaintiffs stand as judgment creditors or 
Seegmiller's assignees, HC may assert all defenses against Plaintiffs as it would have 
against Seegmiller. First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P .2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980) (" [T]he 
• assignor cannot give another a larger right than he has himself."); Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. 
v. McGuire, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1208 (D. Kan. 2002) ("An assignee takes subject to 
all equities and defenses existing between the assignor and the debtor prior to the notice 
of assignment, but not those arising after notice of the assignment."); 7 A COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 106:6 (3d ed. 2015) (" [T]he insurer can assert against the injured party all 
defenses available to against the insured."). See also Section VIII(i) of the Policy ("Any 
person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment 
or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the extent 
of the insurance afforded by this Policy.") (R. 2722 (emphasis added).) That is, Plaintiffs 
stand in Seegmiller's shoes. 
Seegmiller, and thus, Plaintiffs, effectively waived any potential coverage under 
the Policy and are estopped from obtaining coverage now. " [W]aiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."' IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 
UT 3, 1 16, 196 P.3d 588. It may be either express or implied. Id. Estoppel applies 
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when a party makes a statement or conducts himself/herself in a certain manner and 
another party relies on it and would suffer harm if the first party was allowed to "take 
back" its statement. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ~ 14, 158 P.3d 
1088. It is undisputed that Seegmiller failed to timely notify HC of the Highland and 
Herriman Litigation and actively disclaimed coverage for years. Specifically, Seegmiller 
waited over two years to notify HC of the Claim, which deprived HC of the opportunity 
to meaningfully participate in the litigation. Further, prior to notifying HC of the Claim, 
Seegmiller and Prudential omitted any reference to the Highland and Herriman Litigation 
from multiple policy renewal applications. Finally, neither Seegmiller nor Prudential 
ever challenged HC' s coverage analysis; in fact, Seegmiller agreed with HC's decision. 
(R. 2643 , p. 169:1-13; 2644-45, pp. 176:4-177:11; 3186- 88; 3190- 92; 5689) Because 
Seegmiller disclaimed any right to coverage at all times since 2007, Plaintiffs, now 
standing in his shoes, are barred from using the Policy to satisfy their $1 million 
judgment. 
V. HC DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY TO DEFEND SEEGMILLER. 
This Court need not decide whether HC breached its duty to defend Seegmiller in 
the Herriman Litigation because Plaintiffs did not present it as an issue before this Court. 
In their Statement of Issues, Plaintiffs ask this Court to do nothing more than determine 
whether the Policy provides coverage for the judgment Plaintiffs obtained against 
Seegmiller in the Herriman Litigation. That judgment has nothing to do with HC's duty 




Seegmiller's dishonest conduct and therefore concerns only HC's alleged duty to 
indemnify, which HC has shown was never triggered. 
Even if the issue of whether HC breached its duty to defend Seegmiller in the 
Herriman Litigation was before this Court, HC properly determined it had no duty to 
defend Seegmiller. Under Utah law, "an insurer ' has a duty to defend the insured against 
a liability claim which is covered or which is potentially covered."' Summer haze Co., 
L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. , 2014 UT 28, 36, 332 P.3d 908 (quoting Mesmer v. Md. 
Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1061 (Md. 1999)). Even if an insurer initially has a duty 
to defend a claim, that duty ends once it is determined the claim is not covered under the 
policy. E.g., Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Jackson, No. l:07-CV-00162, 2010 WL 
2555120, at * 8 (D. Utah June 21, 2010) (" [I]f ANP AC could establish that all claimed 
bodily injuries arose from Michael's sexual misconduct, ANP A C's duty to defend would 
end."); 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE§ 200:47 (3d ed. 2014) ("Generally, an insurer's duty to 
defend arises out of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the conclusion of the 
underlying lawsuit, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage.") 
( emphasis added). From the moment HC received notice of the Highland and Herriman 
Litigation, it was apparent there was no coverage. In his written notice to HC, McDonald 
specifically stated the Highland and Herriman Litigation contained allegations "that Mr. 
Seegmiller, . . . acting in his capacity as a Prudential agent and a principal in the 
transaction, was part of a conspiracy that fraudulently induced" Plaintiffs to invest 
hundreds of housands of dollars in the Highland and Herriman Transactions. (R. 2888-
90 ( emphasis added).) That is, McDonald confirmed the litigation relates to deals where 
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Seegmiller did not act "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent and acted dishonestly. 
Consequently, HC had no duty to defend Seegmiller. As Plaintiffs stand in Seegmiller's 
shoes, 20 Plaintiffs cannot claim that HC breached its duty to defend. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO GREATER COVERAGE THAN 
THE POLICY AFFORDS SEEGMILLER. 
Whether Plaintiffs stand as judgment creditors or Seegmiller's assignees 1s 
• 
• 
irrelevant. That is, under no circumstances are Plaintiffs entitled to greater coverage than • 
the Policy affords under its plain and unambiguous terms. First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 
P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980) (as Seegmiller's assignees, Plaintiffs took the claims subject 
to all applicable defenses); Mullin v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 541 F. Supp. 1219, 
1224 (D. Utah 2008) Uudgment creditors cannot obtain coverage for a claim that is not 
covered under the plain and unambiguous terms of the policy). Judge Toomey 
specifically found that whether Seegmiller was even acting as Plaintiffs' real estate agent 
in the Herriman Transaction remains a question of fact. (R. 2909-11.) As such, the 
Court may disregard Plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Moreover, the undisputed facts, as demonstrated more fully above, show there is no 
coverage under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy because (1) Seegmiller did 
not act "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent in the Herriman Transaction, if at all, 
(2) Seegmiller did not act "on behalf of' Prudential in the Herriman Transaction, 
(3) Seegmiller did not receive or expect to receive a "fee" in connection with the 
Herriman Transaction that would trigger coverage, ( 4) Seegmiller acted dishonestly, and 
,. 
20 See First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980); 7A COUCH ON 
INSURANCE §106:6 (3d ed. 20 15). 
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• 
(5) Seegmiller waived and/or is estopped from seeking coverage now. As such, 
Plaintiffs, as both judgment creditors and Seegmiller's assignees, cannot recover under 
the Policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Defendant Houston Casualty Company respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm Judge Maughan's decision to GRANT HC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in its entirety and DENY Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this~ day of May, 2016. 
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WILLIAM COMPTON, JOHN SIMCOX, 
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ESTATE, LLC dba'PRUDENTIAL UTAH 
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Case No. 070916209 
Judge Kate A. Toomey . 
This matter Is before the Court ·on the following.motions: (1) Plalritiffs Motion for 
Pllrtlal,Summary Judgment Concerning Robert E. Seegmiller, filed May 9, 2011; (2) Robert 
-Seegmiller's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed May 13, 2011; (3) Robert 
Spegmiller's Motion to Strike, filed May 13, 2011; (4} Robert Seegmillei's Motion to 
Amend, filed August 11, 2011; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning 
Valley View Estates, LLC and Sterling Barnes, filed April 28, 2011; and (6) Sterling Barnes 
aild Valley View Estates, Ll.,C's Motion for Summary Juqgrnent, filed April 13, _2011. The 







2_011. The motions are now ready for decision. 1 
BACKGR01,JND 
In March 2006, Plaintiffs William Compton and John Simcox met Defendant Robert 
Seegmiller, a real estate agent working for Prudential Utah Real Estate. The parties 
discussed their common interest in developing· commercial land. Mr. Seegmiller showed 
the Plaintiffs various properties for prospective purchase, provided them with information 
about comparable sales, assisted with negotiations to purchase property, and drafted 
documents on the Plaintiffs' behalf. 
On September 21, 2006, Mr. Seegmiller Identified a promising parcel of real estatEI 
in Herriman, Utah. On December 26, the Plaintiffs company Saltalr Investments, LLC 
entered into a real estate purchase contract ('REPC") to buy the property from Defendant 
Valley View Estates, LLC. The REPC required that Salt.air deposit $705,000 in earnest 
money for the pqtential purchase of the lots. On November 29, 2006 and January 4 and 
10, 2007, the Piaintiffs deposited the earnest money into an escrow account with Surety 
Trtle Agency, per the terms of the REPC. The REPC provided that the earnest money 
w0uld become non-refundable once the plat was recorded. 
The REPC, Addendum 1, provides: 
2, nie Buyer will secure their specific Lots or priority position with a 
paid reservation deposit in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND dollars 
($15,000) per lot by making a check or wire transfer payable to the 
Sellers Title Company. Once the plat is recorded this money will 
become non-refundable to the buyers. 
3. As soon as the Lots are recorded the Buyer will be notified. No later 
than t~n days after notification of reC?rdation of the final plat, each 
1 Mr. Barnes and Valley View filed a Motion to Strike Affidavit of Thor Roundy. 







reservation deposit will be converted to earnest money and this Real 
Estafe Purchase Contract wm replace the reservation held on each Jot. 
This purchase contract and addendum will identify the specific price 
and settlement date. The Buyer will be notified by certified mail of the 
recordation of the plat. . 
4. Buyer will close on all lots identified below thirty (30) days after any 
adjustments per agreernerit and building permits can be issued by the 
city. . 
On January 10, 2007, Defendant Sterling Barnes and Brett Redd,2 owners of Land 
D~velopment Alliance· ("LDA"), purchased the Herriman property for $7,458,500, 
Defendant Valley View Estates, also owned by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Redd, then purchased 
Iha property from LOA for $12,886,500. LOA "loaned" $5,609,162 to Valley View to pay . 
the closing costs .. In fact, it was the Plaintiffs' escrow money that was deposited With the 
same institution (Defendant Surety Title Agency) that was used to pay the closing costs: 
Meanwhile, ANS Financial NA. agreed to loan Valley View over $16 million. Of that 
money, $7 rnifllon was deposited with Surety Title Group for the purchase ofthe property, 
. Land Development Alliance got $1.5 million, and Mr. Seegmiller and two other men got 
$304,000 to share. 
Valley View failed to develop the property pursuant to the terms promised by Mr. 
· Barnes, and the Plaintiffs attempted to exercise their right to cancel the REPC and forego 
purchasing the lots. However, Surety could not return the earnest money be·cause It had 
released the money to.Valley View upon Sterling Barnes's request. 
The Plaintiffs have brought causes of action against Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential. 
for accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
and conspiracy. Against Mr. Barnes and Valley View, the Plaintiffs bring claims for 









accounting, theft, fraud, and conspiracy. 
DISCUSSION 
There are four motions for summary judgment before the Court. The Plaintiffs move 
for partial summary judgment against Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential on their claims for 
breach offiduciary duty and negligence. Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential ffled a cross-motion 
for _summary judgment The Plaintiffs also ,:nave for summary judgment on all claims 
against Mr. Barnes and Valley View. Mr. Barnes and Valley View filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment. 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact _and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56{c). "A lriaf court is not authorized to weigh facts In 
decidlng a summary judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of 
material fact.exists, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 
2002 UT 17, ,i ~4. 42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). '"A genuine issue of fact exists where, 
o·n the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ' on any material 
Issue." Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 6_55 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
Mr. Seeqmlller's Motion for Leave to Amend . 
Mr. Seegmiller moves the Court for leave to amend his Memorandum in Opposition 





oppose the motion, and the Court GRANTS the motion. 
Mr. Seegmiller's Motion to Strike 
Mr. Seegmiller moves the Court to strike certain paragraphs of the Affidavit of John 
Simcox filed in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Mr. Simcox 
testified as lo what Mr. Seegmiller said to co-Plaintiff Mr. Compton. Rule 56{e), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires affidavits to be made on personal knowledge. Mr. Simcox 
do.es not have personal knowledge of the intentions and actions of his co-plaintiff, and the 
Court GRANTS the motion as lo paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 of Mr. 
Simcox's affidavit. 
Claims against Mr, Seegmliler and Prudential 
The Plaintiffs claim·thal between March 15, 2006 through early 2007, Mr Seegmiller 
acted as their real estate agent and thus owed them certain_ fiduciary duties. They also 
argue that even if Mr. Seegmiller was not acting as their agent, he nevertheless breached 
common law duties owed lo them. 
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Real estate agents owe fiduciary duties to their clients, including the duties of 
diligence, loyalty, full disclosure, honesty, care, and good faith. See, e.g., Hopkins v. 
Warriley Corp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1982). The Utah Administrative Code provides 
that an agent owes, inter alia, the following duties: protect and pr:omote the interests of the 







and diligence,. The agent must provide a written agency agreement defining the scope of 
··representation. Utah Admin. Code Rule 162. 
The Plaintiffs argue that they believed Mr. Seegmiller was acting as their real estate 
agent during the process of the Herriman property purchase, and they put their trust in him. 
They claim that he breached an agent's fiduciary duties to his principals. For example, 
they cite that he pfaced his own Interest ahead of theirs when he accepted a fee from 
VaJJeyView; he did not provide discJ.osure of material information, especially details of the 
"flip" sale; he failed to conduct due diligence on Valley View's financial status; he failed to 
provide a written agency agreement or disclose in writing the scope of his representation; 
ha failed to draft the REPC in a manner that prohibited Mr. Barnes and Valley View from 
using the earnest f!Joneythe Plaintiffs had deposited with Surety; he fa fled to Include terms 
in the REPC for the re tum of the earnest money; and he failed to supply Surety with a copy 
of the REPC an·d Its escrow Instructions. 
Before the Court can consider' the breach of fiduciary duty claims, it must determine 
whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting as real estate agent for Mr. Compton and Mr. Simcox. 
If Mr. Seegmiller was not their agent, _he does not owe the Plaintiffs the same duties a 
fidllciary owes a client. The Utah Court of Appeals explains "agency:" 
The key relationship between a real estate broker and a dient is 
agency, and the universal laws applying to principals and agents 
control their tights and responsibilities. Agency is the fiduciary 
relation which results from the ma•nifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
controi, and consent by the other so to act. Thus, for Welsh to show 
WardJey was· his aQehl, he must prove that (1) he manifested that 
Wardley could act for him; (2) Wardley accepted the proposed 
undertaking, and (3) both Welsh and Wardley understood that Welsh 
was to be In charge of the undertaking. In other words, an agency Is 






made: a meepng of the minds must exist between the parties. 
Moreover, an.d critical in this case, [a]n agency relationship can arise 
only at the will and.by the act of the principal. · · 
Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotc1tlons and 
citations omitted). 
The .Court first considers the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs in favor of finding 
an agency relc1tlonship. The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Seegmiller •represented his 
c~dentials to plaintiffs and told plaintiffs that he would represent them as a buyer's real 
estate agent: .He showed potential Investment properties to. the Plaintiffs. and provided 
them with sales data and Mµlilpie Listing Service ("MLS") info." Mr. Seegmiller drafted the 
REPC for purchase of !he Herriman property on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and he did not 
object Wheri another party filled in his name as the buyer's agent. 
The Court .also considers Mr. Seegmiller's arguments against finding that he was 
a~ng as a rear estate agent for the Plaintiffs. Mr. Seegmiller denies that he ever told the 
Plaintiffs ·he would repr.esent them In any capacity; he denies filling .in his 'riame on the 
·RePC as the Pl~intiffs agent;° and he argues that he was m~refy contributing his expertise 
a~ a member of a group of lnyestors. He raises the is.sue that the "broker" field in the 
REPC wa·s left blaok,. where normally he. would write In Prudential; without the backing of 
Prudential, he clai_ms that he could not legally represent Plaintiffs as their agent. Mr. 
Seegmiller did not provide any sort _of agency contract to the Plaintiffs nor did he make 
mention of any agent-client relationship. He acknqwledges that ha drafted the REPC 
requirim{Plaintlffs earnest money to be deposited with-Surety but clalms that the Plaintiffs 
negotiated the amount · of earnest money with Mr. Barnes, and Mr. Seegmlller only 








The Court concludes that issues of fad remain whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting 
as the Plaintiff's real estate agent Both parties submitted an expert affidavit. The 
Plaintiffs' expert concluded that Mr. Seegmiller was acting as the Plaintiffs' agent, and Mr. 
Seegmiller's expert opined that he was not. There is evidence supporting each position, 
and on several contentions the parties plainly disagree as to the facts. Thls issue Is 
therefore reserved for the jury as the trier of fact. 
Claim for Negligence 
Even if a real estatf:l ageht js not acting in the capacity of agent for another party, 
he sbll owes certain duties to all parties to any transaction In which he is involved. Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). Under the Utah Administrative Code Section 
1 e2-2f, an agent involved in a transaction must disclose in writing his agency relationships. 
He must disclose In writing to all parties to the transaction any compensation he will 
receive. 
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Seegmiller bte·ached his common law duties toward 
thBm, including: failing to advise them to consult an attorney; failing to draft necessary 
terms in the REPC; faillng to deliver a copy of the REPC to Surety; maintaining and hiding 
a conflict of interest {by receiving money from Valley View); failing to obtaih escrow 
instructions, failing to disclose in writing his agency relationships or any fees he might 
. . 
collect; and concealing the fact that Valley View planned to remove the escrow money to 
finance the purchase. 
The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Seegmiller's failure to disclose material information 
caused them to rely on his advice and deposit a large sum of money Into the escrow 






Seegmiller breached his duties to the Plaintiffs, thus causing them harm. 
Mr. Seegmiller argues that 'the breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims are 
barred by the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule bars tort recovery for contract 
claims. Where a contract exists, recovery is limited to the terms of that contract. .SM£ 
lntius., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, ,r 30, 28 P.3d 
6$9. Mr. Seegmiller argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are based on a theory that there was 
a quasi-contract between Mr. Seegmiller and the Plaintiffs, and therefore the Plaintiffs are 
b~rred from bringing any tort claim outside the contract. 3 
The economic loss rule.d~s not bar tort claims based upon duties independent of 
thOse found in a contract. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ,r 51, 70 P.3d 1. 
When an independent duty exists, the rule does not bar tort claims based on a duty of 
c.1re. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ,r 15, 48 P.3d 235 (holding that real estate 
brokers owe a duty to pro·spective buyers to disclose material facts about the property). 
The Court con.eludes that regafdless of whether Mr. Seegmiller was ·acting as the 
real estate agent tor' Plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing the Herriman lots, he owed 
certain duties· to the Plaintiffs, which · he breached by failing to clarify his role in the 
transaction, and failing to dlsdose a personal interest in the transaction. 
3 Under the economic loss rule, a duty is owed only to the parties to a contract. 
Tile "implied duty to use reasonable and customary care In the provision of professional 
services arising from contract is owed only to the person or entity for whom the 
professional services are to be rendered." SM£ Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
stalnbsck & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 1J 30, 28 P.3d 669. The "economic loss rule" 
provides thal one may not recover "economic" damages for a non-Intentional tort. 
E¢0nomlc loss is defin.ed as: "Damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and 
replacement of th.e defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim 
of.pei:sonal injury or damage to other property." Am. Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI 












Mr. Seegmiller, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, argues that he is not 
personally liable for the alleged bad acts _because Prudential is liable for the acts of its 
agents within the scope of employment authority. See Hadges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 
P.2d 151, 156-(Utah 1991) (an agent acting on behalf of broker is notliable for torts unless 
he intended to be personally liable).. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a 
supe1Visor may be l!able along with the agent. Prudential's potential liability does not 
for,ec)ose Mr. Seegmiller's Joint liability. AIi agent may be held liable for his own torts. 
Brady v. Rooseveft SS Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Coor! DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim and GRANTS summary 
judgment on the claim for negligence . 
Claims agajnst'sterling Barnes and Valley View Estate 
The Plaintiffs and Sterling Barnes arid. Valley View have filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment on the cl?ims for theft, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
conspiracy, 
The REPC, Addendum 1, discusses the Plaintiffs' earnest money: 
2. The Buyer will secure their specific Lots or -priority position with a 
paid reservation deposit in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND dollars 
($.15,000) per lot by making a check or wire transfer payable to the 
Sellers Title Company. Once the plat is recorded this money will 
become non-refundable to the buyer,, 
3·. As-soon as the Lots ·are recorded the Buyer will be notified. No later 
than ten days after notification of recordation of the final plat, each 
reservation deposit Will be converted to earnest money and this Real 
Estate Purchase Contract will replace the reservation held on each lot. 
This purchase contract and addendum will Identify the specific •price 






recordatioO of the plat. 
4. Buyer will close on all iots identified below thirty (30) days after any 
adjustments per agreement and building pennits can be ·issued bythe 
dty. 
(6.mphasis added.) 
Th~ plat was n.ot recorded until March 6, 2007, but Mr. Barnes caused the escrow 
rrwney to b"e rem.oved-fr()m the accou·nt ori January to, contrary to the tenns of the REPC. 
The REPC proyides. that the eam(;lst money was to be held in escrow until closing, and 
closing coµ)d hot have oe¢urted pn·or to September 7, 2007 (30 days after the city 
authorized the permits). The Plaintiff)> were not notified by certified mail that the plats were 
recotded. It was not until August 3 -whe·n the· Plaintiffs notified Valley View of their intent 
IQ cancel the transaqlon :.. tnat they learned that the eame~t money had been taken 
. months earlier. 
Thsff/Convarsion 
. i:nett occurs when a person "obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
prbpe"rty ofanotber With a J;>Ur'pose to deprlve him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. 
Toe Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes (through Valley View) stole the Plaintiffs' $704,000 
eqmest money deposit. The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Barnes was aware that he was not 
ent,tied _to the esea:row i:noney; evfdenced by the fact that he did not provide a copy of the 
REPC's escrow insti:uctiohs to Surety Trtle. Mr. Barnes also told the escrow officer thatthe 
money was his own when it was·not. 
Mr .. Barnes. first counters that there is no provision in the REPC prohibiting Valley 
Vi~s use of the earnest money; The REPC provides: "No later than ten days after 













earnest money-[.r Clearly, the fact that the contract provides for how the m~mey shall be 
used is an implicit message that the money may not be used for other purposes. 
Mr. Barnes next claims that the Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for theft because 
they did not have the earnest money in their-possession at the time it was taken. See 
Flbro Trost, Inc. v; Broman Financial, Inc., 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 1999) (claimant must show 
he was immediately entiU"ed to possession of the property at the time of the alleged theft). 
This argument is unavamng. The Plaintiffs had the right to a refund of their earnest money 
until the plats were rec.ordeci. Mr. Ba.mes took the money from the acco~nt prior to the 
recording of the plats.. 
The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient evidence to 
pmve the elements of theft. Mr. Sterling and Valley View unlawfully took the earnest 
money, depriving the Plaintiffs of their property . 
Fraud 
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes (and Valley Vle"W) committed fraud by 
misrepresentation. Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifies that claims of fraud 
s!Jall be stated with particularity, The elements of fraud are: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the 
representer either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that there was lnsuff1eienl knoWledge upon which to 
base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it and (e) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and In Ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely_ 
upon 1t (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) lo that party's 
Injury and damage. 
Aimed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 1116, 70 P.3d 35 (citations omitted). 
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The standard of proof for establlshing a claim of fraud is clear and convincing 
evigence. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ,r 41, 5$ P .3d 524, 536. The 
Court cannot detennine with certainty Mr. Bames's intent regarding the earnest money . 
when he executed the REPC with the Plaintiffs. this detennination must be left to the trier 
offacl . 
The Plalntiffs ·rtext argue that Mr. Barnes committed fraud by misrepresentation 
through non-disclosure, specifJCallythat he failed to disclose the following: the Defendants 
were structuring the land safe ·as a "flip"; Mr. Seegmiller would be financially compensated 
in return for convincing the Plaintiffs to deposit the earnest money; Mr. Barnes did not have 
Iha financial means to develop ·the property as_ he had represented; and the Plaintiffs' 
earnest money had been taken and used for another purpose. 
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes had a duty to speak because he was in a 
sUperior posltlon to know the material facts around the purchase. Fraudulent concealment 
requires a showing that one with a duty or obligation to communicate certain facts 
remained silent or concealed material facts. •such a duty or obligation may arise from a 
relationship of trust between the parties, an inequality of knowledge or power between the 








Proving fraud carries a heavy burden. _The Court determines that the Plaintiffs have 
n111t established clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent concealment. There remain 
is$ues of fact regarding what information Mr. Barnes actually passed on to the Plaintiffs. 
The Court reserves this Issue for the jury . 
Negligent Misrepresentation 
Mr. Barnes kept the Plaintiffs apprised of the estimated time line for the development 
project. Specifically, ha updated the Pfalntiffs In November and December 2006 and 
Jcinuary 2007. The date of completion was material to the Plaintiffs because they hoped 
to:resell the developed lots While the real estate market was high. Mr. Barnes told the 
Plaintiffs that the lots. would be ready for resale as early as June 2007, but that was 
Incorrect. 
The Plaitrtiffs now claim that Mr. Barnes did not have experience as a developer or 
enough information to make such promises. Negligent misrepresentation occurs when: 
(1) one having a pecuniary inte.rest in a transaction, (2) is in a 
superior position to ·know material facts, and (3) carelessly or 
negligently makes a false representation concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the 
other party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representer can be held responsible if the other 
elements of f1pud are also present. 
DeBry v. Ve/fey Mortg. Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). 
Ne91igent misrepresentatio_n carries a lesser mental state than fraud, ·•requiring only that the 
seiier act carelessly or negligently." Robinson v. Tripco Inv., !he., 2000 UT App 200, 1113, 
21 P..3d 219. 





because he took it upon himself to keep the Plaintiffs updated on the project and he signed 
the closing papers 0n behalf of Valley View. Mr. Sames disagrees that he was in a superior 
position. It appears to the Court that Mr. Sames held himself out to possess pertinent 
information that was· material to the Plaintiffs, and he passed along relevant information at 
various times throughout the transaction. He was, to some extent, in a superior position 
arid mad_e several misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs. However, whether those 
representations were negligent Js as yet uncertain. The Court does not have sufficient 
information to determine whether Mr. Bames's representallons regarding the estimated 
completion dat~ were reasonable. An incorrect guess is not necessarily negligent This 
issue is left for determination by the jury. 
Conspiracy 
The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Barnes, Valley View, and Mr. Seegmiller conspired to 
coerce the Plaintiffs to execute·the REPC and deposit the earnest money into an escrow 
ae¢0unt, which would then be used by Valley View to obtain a loan to acquire the Herriman 
property. 
Conspiracy requires the following elements: "(1) a combination of two or more 
pemons, (2) an object to b·e accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or 
co~rse of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximal~ 
reS1.Jlt thereof." Israel Pag_an £state v, Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The Plaintiffs claim that the theft of their money could not have occurred unless both 
Mr. Seegmiller and Mr. Barnes failed to provide REPCs to Surety and Mr. Sames 
misrepresented the source of th~ money to the escrow officer. 






Seegmiller had a _meeting of the minds to defraud the Plaintiffs. Just because two steps 
may be required to achieve a certain outcome does not necessarily mean that commission 
of those two st_eps was intentional ln relation to one another. . 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) DENIES in part (claim for fiduciary duty) and 
GRANTS in part (claim for negligence) Plaintiff ' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Concerning Robert E. Seegmiller, (2) GRANTS in part (claim for fiduciary duty) and DENI ES 
in part (claim for negligence) Robert Seegmiller's Cross Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, (3) GRANTS Robert Seegmiller's Motion to Strike, (4) GRANTS Robert 
Seegmlller's Motion to Amend, (5) GRANTS in part (claim for theft/conversion) and DENI ES 
in part (claims for fraod, negligent representation and conspiracy) Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Suinmary Judgment- Concerning Valley View Estates, LLC and Sterling Barnes, and (6) 
GRANTS in part (claims forfraud, negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy) and DENIES 
. . 
in part (claim for thefl/conversion)Sterling Barnes and Valley View Estates, LLC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
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The Order of Court is stated below: / .... · /\ 
Dated: September 10, 2015 Isl PA UL -G ·MAUGHAN 
01 :22:22 PM Distric~ Cciu;t; Judge / 
KEITH A. CALL ( 6708) 
ROBERT T. DENNY (13687) 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Facsimile: (80 l) 363-0400 
Attorneys for Defendants Daniel J. McDonald 
and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
··-..~~t·,·~~: ,,-~;·;f,/ 
WILLIAM COMPTON, and JOHN 
SIMCOX, individuals, and SALT AIR 
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, 
FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART 
AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS 
ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL J. McDONALD, an individual, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company, 
HOUSTON CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
Texas licensed insurance company and 
JOHN DOES 2-10, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 13090613 7 
Judge Paul Maughan 
Pending before the Court are the following motions: 
1. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims. 
I Error! Unknown document property name.OJ Error! Unknown document property name.002445007.1 
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2. Houston Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Houston 
Casualty Company. 
4. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: Damages and Causation. 
5. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment re: Breach. 
The Court held a hearing on these motions on August 13, 2015. Thor Roundy appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiffs. Keith A. Call and Robert W. Lin appeared on behalf of Daniel J. 
McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC (collectively, the "Lawyer Defendants"). Karl A. 
Bekeny and Rebecca Hill appeared on behalf of Houston Casualty Company. 
After careful consideration of the briefing submitted and the arguments of the parties 
presented on August 13, 2015, the Court RULES and ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims is hereby GRANTED in its entirety. All 
claims against Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC are DISMISSED 
with prejudice. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs, William Compton, John Simcox and Saltair Investments, LLC, 
have sued the Lawyer Defendants for legal malpractice. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs never 
had an attorney-client relationship with the Lawyer Defendants. Rather, they have taken their 
claims for legal malpractice by assignment from the Lawyer Defendants' former client, Bobby 
Seegmiller. The Lawyer Defendants' motion seeks an order that legal malpractice claims are not 
07406 
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assignable as a matter of law, at least under the facts of this case. 
In U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. U.S. Sports Specialty Ass'n, 2:07-CV-996-TS, 2012 
WL 6624202, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 2012), the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah determined that the Utah Supreme Court would likely adopt the majority rule that legal 
malpractice claims may not be assigned. In Sleepy Holdings, LLC v. Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Case 
No. 120401523, (Fourth District Court, State of Utah), the trial court entered a Ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, Motion to Consolidate, and on Defendant Snell & Willmer [sic] 
L.L.P. and Wade Budge's Motion to Dismiss on July 15, 2013. In that ruling, the Court found 
that legal malpractice claims are not voluntarily assignable. In consideration of those cases and 
the public policy considerations as outlined in Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 
389,397, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. app. 1976), as well the policy considerations outlined in 
the various other jurisdictions that prohibit the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims, 
this Court adopts the majority rule in this case and finds that legal malpractice claims are not 
voluntarily assignable, at least under the circumstances of this case. 
Specifically, the Court is persuaded that this case represents exactly why a majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States have prohibited voluntary assignment of legal malpractice 
claims. For example, allowing voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims would 
compromise a client's expectation of confidentiality and loyalty, along with the lawyer's duty to 
provide the same. The Court finds that these policies have been violated here. For example, Mr. 
Seegmiller, the "client" in the underlying case and the "assignor" of the legal malpractice claims, 
has shared with Plaintiffs in this case attorney-client communications not only between himself 
and the Lawyer Defendants, but also between his former co-client (Prudential Real Estate) and 
07407 
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the Lawyer Defendants. Thus, the attorney-client privilege between Prudential Real Estate and 
the Lawyer Defendants was violated. In addition, allowing voluntary assignment of legal 
malpractice claims would increase the risk that a client who was satisfied with his legal 
representation would be exploited or coerced to invent and assign a legal malpractice claim in 
order to get out from under a judgment entered against him. In this case, it appears that Mr. 
Seegmiller had no intention of bringing a legal malpractice claim, but may have been unduly 
influenced to assign and "cooperate" with Plaintiffs' pursuit of a malpractice claim to get out 
from under a judgment that the Plaintiffs had obtained against him. Even if confidential 
information was not shared with Plaintiffs, and even if the former client was not exploited or 
unduly influenced, the circumstances of this case show that the risk of such is real and that legal 
malpractice claims should therefore not be voluntarily assignable. 
The Court fmiher finds that to allow voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims, 
especially in view of the facts here, would pry apart, or risk prying apart, the attorney-client 
relationship, would adversely reflect on the judicial process, and should not be encouraged. 
At the August 13, 2015 hearing, Plaintiffs argued that the Court could allow them to 
substitute Mr. Seegmiller as Plaintiff in this case, thereby resolving any concern with respect to 
Mr. Seegmiller's voluntary transfer of his legal malpractice claims. In Botma v. Huser, 39 P.3d 
538, 543 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals of Arizona invalidated an assignment of 
legal malpractice claims. Just as here, the plaintiff in Botma argued that the assignor of the legal 
malpractice claim should be able to continue to pursue the claim. The Court held that the 
assignor had "nothing to ' retain' in the present lawsuit, a lawsuit that can benefit only [assignee]. 
The purpose of the assignment agreement was only to allow [assignee] to recover any and all 
07408 
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monies which might be owing to [assignor] and that [assignee] will be the ultimate beneficiary of 
[assignor's] claims. To allow the present lawsuit, which was born out of that assignment 
agreement, to proceed in [assignor's] name would be to wink at the rule against assignment of 
legal malpractice claims." id. at 543. 
The Court finds this reasoning persuasive. Here, just as in Botma, there is no dispute that 
Plaintiff is the ultimate beneficiary of the alleged malpractice claims. To allow this lawsuit, 
which was born out of an invalid assignment, to proceed in Mr. Seegmiller's name, would be to 
wink at the rule against assignment of legal malpractice claims. 
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith 
Haitvigsen's Motion for Summary Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice. The Court 
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen from the suit. 
2. Defendant Houston Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment 1s 
hereby GRANTED in its entirety. All claims against Defendant Houston Casualty Company are 
DISMISSED with prejudice. 
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege they are entitled, as both judgment 
creditors and Robert Seegmiller's assignees, to recover $1,04 1,275.34 from Houston Casualty 
Company as a result of Houston Casualty Company's decision to deny coverage for Robett 
Seegmiller with respect to two underlying lawsuits in which Plaintiffs sued Robert Seegmiller, 
among others. 1 On October 18, 2011, the Court in the Herriman Lawsuit granted summary 
judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Robett Seegmiller; Plaintiffs subsequently obtained a 
judgment in the Herriman Lawsuit against Robert Seegmiller for $1,041,275.34 on June 7, 2012. 
1 The two underlying lawsuits are: Simcox, et al. v. Seegmiller, et al., Case No. 070916208, filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (the "Highland Lawsuit") and Compton, et al. v. Seegmiller, et al., Case 
No. 070916209, filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (the "Herriman Lawsuit"). 
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Plaintiffs allege Houston Casualty Company is liable under one or more insurance 
policies Houston Casualty Company issued to Utah County Real Estate, LLC ("Prudential") 
from November 26, 2006 through November 26, 2009.2 During that time, Robert Seegmiller 
was a Pmdential real estate agent. 
Pursuant to the HCC Policies ' Insuring Agreement and Endorsements 1 and 5 of the HCC 
Policies, Houston Casualty Company agreed to provide insurance coverage to Prudential, and its 
real estate agents while providing Professional Services "on behalf of' Prudential, "[s]olely in 
the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others 
for a fee." In her October 18, 2011 Memorandum and Decision in the Herriman Lawsuit, the 
Honorable Kate Toomey ruled that "regardless of whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting as the real 
estate agent for Plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing the Herriman lots, he owed certain duties 
to the Plaintiff [sic], which he breached by failing to clarify his role in the transaction, and failing 
to disclose a personal interest in the transaction." Because Robe1i Seegmiller had a personal 
interest, he held dual or competing roles in the transaction giving rise to the Herriman Lawsuit. 
Robert Seegmiller cannot have held dual or competing roles in the transaction and 
simultaneously have acted "solely" as Plaintiffs' real estate agent "on behalf of' Prudential. As 
such, there is no coverage for Robert Seegmiller for the Herriman Lawsuit under the HCC 
Policies as a matter of law. 
Further, at the hearing Plaintiffs argued that pursuant to Section VIII(i) of the HCC 
2 From November 26, 2006 to November 26, 2009, Houston Casualty Company provided Professional Liabil ity 
Errors and Omissions Insurance to Prndential and its real estate agents under three successive policies that contained 
the same material terms. Policy H706- l 7424 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 2006 to November 26, 
2007; Policy No. H707-16855 covered the Pol icy Period of November 26, 2007 to November 26, 2008; and Pol icy 
No. H708-l 6288 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 2008 to November 26, 2009 (the pol icies are, 
collectively, the "HCC Policies"). 
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Policies, Plaintiffs, as judgment creditors, have a direct right of action against Houston Casualty 
Company regardless of whether Robeti Seegmiller was covered by the HCC Policies. Section 
VIII(i) of the HCC Policies states that "[a]ny person or organization or the legal representative 
thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to 
recover under this Policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this Policy." The Couti finds 
that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of Section Vlll(i), Plaintiffs cannot obtain 
greater coverage than the HCC Policies provide for Robert Seegmiller. The Court has ruled that 
the HCC Policies do not provide coverage for Robert Seegmiller. Therefore Plaintiffs, whether 
as judgment creditors or assignees, are similarly not entitled to coverage under the HCC Policies. 
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Houston Casualty Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Houston Casualty Company 
from the suit. 
3. For the reasons discussed in Section 2, above, the Couti DENIES Plaintiffs' Cross 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Houston Casualty Company. 
4. For the reasons discussed in Section 2, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and 
DENIES-IN-PART Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for 
Summary Judgment re: Damages and Causation. The Court grants the motion as to the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that implicate insurance coverage with respect to 
claims made against Bobby Seegmiller. To the extent there are allegations that do not implicate 
insurance coverage with respect to claims made against Bobby Seegmiller, the Court denies the 
motion as to those allegations. 
5. The Court DENIES Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's 
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Amended Motion for Summary Judgment re: Breach. 
In light of the Court's rulings contained in this Order, all claims against all Defendants 
are being dismissed with prejudice. This Order addresses a ll claims asserted against all 
Defendants, and dismisses this case in its entirety, with prejudice. This constitutes the final order 
of the Court. 
---------------END OF ORD ER---------------
*** Entered by the Court on the date indicated by the Court's Seal at the top of the first page*** 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 




September 10, 2015 01 :22 PM 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Isl Keith A Call 
Keith A. Call 
Robert T. Denny 
Attorneys for Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
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Date: September 8, 2015 
September 10, 2015 01 :22 PM 
TUCKER ELLIS LLP 
Isl Karl A. Bekeny 
Karl A. Bekeny, admitted pro hac vice 
(Signature added by Counsel for Attorneys for 
Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith 
Hartvigsen, PLLC with permission) 
CHRJSTENSEN & JENSEN 
Rebecca Hill 
Attorneys for Defendant Houston Casualty 
Company 
Isl Thor Roundv 
Thor Roundy 
Attorney for Plaintiffs William Compton, John 
Simcox and Saltair Investments, LLC 
(Signature added by Counsel for Attorneys for 
Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 81h day of September, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN PART AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE, to be 
electronically fi led via the Court's GreenFiling system which will send notification to the 
following: 
Cory B. Mattson, Attorney 
Thor Roundy, Attorney 
801 North 500 West, Suite 150 
Bountiful, Utah 840 10 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Rebecca Hill, Attorney 
Christensen & Jensen 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Houston Casualty Company 
Karl A. Bekeny, Attorney, admitted pro hac vice 
Kevin M. Young, Attorney, admitted pro hac vice 
Tucker Ellis LLP 
950 Main A venue, Suite 1100 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-7213 
Attorneys for Houston Casualty Company 
Isl Cvnthia L. Worne 
Legal Assistant 
3376630vl 
September 10, 2015 01 :22 PM 
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Recipients 
REBECCA L HILL - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23 : 13.423. 
KEITH A CALL - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23: 13.36. 
Cory Mattson - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13~23: 11.53. 
THOR B ROUNDY - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23: 11.547. 
ROBERT T DENNY - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23:12.61. 
07415 
• 
... ••• IMPORTANT NOTICE· READ THIS INFORMATION .,.,. 
NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING [NEFJ 
A filing has been submitted to the court RE: 130906137 
Judge: 
PAUL G MAUGHAN 




Filed by or in behalf of: 
09-10-2015: 13:22:29 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
District 
Salt Lake 
COMPTON, W ILLIAM, et al. vs. MCDONALD, 
DANIEL J, et al. 
Order - Final Order Granting Motions for 
Summary Judgment in Part and Dismissing Case 
in Its Entirety With Prejudice 
PAUL G MAUGHAN 
This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system. 
The following people were served electronically: 
REBECCA L HILL for HOUSTON CASUAL TY 
COMPANY 
ROBERT T DENNY for DANIEL J MCDONALD, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC 
KEITH A CALL for DANIEL J MCDONALD, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC 
CORY B MATTSON for WILLIAM COMPTON et 
al 
THOR B ROUNDY for WILLIAM COMPTON et al 
The following people have not been served electronically by the Court. Therefore, if service 
is required, they must be served by traditional means: 
JOHN X DOE 





The undersigned hereby certifies that the attached Declarations, Endorsements, 
Application and Policy Form (Professional Liability Errors & Omissions Insurance) combined 
form a true, complete and accurate copy of Houston Casualty Company Policy No. H707-1 6865 
as issued in favor of Utah Countv Real Estate, LLC OBA: Prudential Utah Real Estate OBA: 
Prndentia1 Cres Commercial Real.Estate. 
HCC Specialty 
on behalf of Houston Casualty Company 
/.) 
, 1/ 1 • . ~ l ,1-),1 ( ! \ / (.,(__u_J!..L"h .3'. . / \.J·:\ .. ,_: , 
Pauline Morley, Senio r Vi r -Prcsi<lenl 
Autho1i zed Representative ,) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 C1 +~ay of O Ch b c' r 2 0 f 4- in 
Mount Kisco , New York by Pauline Morley to me kno'Arn, and k nown to me to be an authorized 
representative of HCC Specialty on behalf of U.S. Specialty lnsurance Company and who 
executed the foregoi ng Certification, and who duly acknowledged to me that he did execute the 
same. 
Jill E. TORRES 
NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE OF NEW VORK 
No . 02106134572 
QUQ.Jlll_et;l. In Weslc h eslef..C.oun!y 




Broker No .. 
HO USTON CASUALTY COIVIPANY 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES: 13403 NORTHWEST FREEWAY, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77040 
DECLARATIONS 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE 
THI S IS A CLAIMS MADE POLICY 
9991146 No.: H707 - 16865 
TRI-CITY BROKERAGE, INC. Renewal of: i-!706 - 17424 
ltem1 . Namedlnsured: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC DBA : 
PRUDENTIAL 1.J'T.'Ai-i REAL ES'.I'A'I'E OBA : 
PRUDENTIAL CRES COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
Item 2. Address: 2 4 0 N OREM BLVD. 
OREM, UT 84057 
Item 3. Named lnsured's Profession: See Endorsement fr 1 , E32 
Item 4. Limit of Liability: $ 
Item 5. Deductible: $ 
1,000,000 
35 , 000 
Each Claim and in the Aggregate 
including Claim Expenses. 
Each Claim incfuding Claim Expenses . 
Item 6. Notice of Claim to: PIA, Director of Claims 
37 Radio C ircle Drive, Mount Kisco, NY 10549 
Item?. PolicyPeriod: lnceptionDate: 11/26/07 Expiration Date: 11/26/08 
i2:01 A.M. Standard Time at the address of the Named Insured herein. 
Item 8. Retroactive Date: 8 / 01 / 0 l Item 9. Date of Application: 8/ 2 9/07 
Item 10. Premium: $ 36 , 965 . 00 Administrative/Inspection fee . $50 . 00 
- -- Item ·t--1-, Extens1cn-Peri0d;---l,--2--M:;.)J.-.f~f-H;3.-----·-·-·Itern ·12- & tension-Pereentage,-- -12-.5. :,, .;s~ • -
Attachments: (l)E32 , (2)E46, (3)El7 , (4)El 27 , ( 5) El61, (6) E1 33, (7)El66 , 
(8)E34, (9)E109, (10)853, (ll)El74, (12) El92, (13)El93 . 
MPL00l (09/06) 
This Policy has been signed at 
11/26/ 07 
U1...,0ic- •· .!::T,,:Jrfl c ' f-<.i ver NJ 
- L•' - . . , • • .• ••. . • ' . / ~ •• • 






- -----·•-~---- - ~------------- ------- - -------------
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
ERRORS & Ofv1JSSIONS INSURANCE 
(This Insurance Is On A Claims Made Basis) 
THIS POLICY IS LIMITED TO LIABILITY fOR ONLY 11-lOSE CLAIMS 11-lAT ARE FIRST MADE AGAINST THE 
INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD. DEFENSE COSTS REDUCE THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY PROVIDED. 
PLEASE REVIEW THIS POLICY CAREFULLY WITH YOUR INSURANCE BROKER OR ADVISOR. 
In consideration ot the payment of the premium, the undertaking of the Insured to pay the Deductible herein and 
in reliance upon all statements made and Information In the appllcatlon, Which is attached hereto and made a part 
or this Policy, and subiect to all the terms and conditions of this Policy, the Company agrees with tile Insured as 
follows: 
I. COVERAGE 
Coverage.Payment and Claims Mad& Provlsfon 
The Company shall pay on behalf or the Insured any Loss and Claim Expenses In excess of the Deductible 
amount and s·ubject to the Limit of Llability as the Insured acting In the profession descri>ed in Item 3 of the 
Declarations shall become legally obligated to pay tor Claim or Claims first made against'ttie Insured during 
the Poficy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured provided always that the Insured has no 
knowledge ot such Wrongful Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy and further provided that such 
Wrongful Act took piace subsequent to the Retroactive Date set forth In rtem 8 of the Declarations. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
Whenever used in this Policy, the following terms or words are defined as follows: 
a) Policy Period 
"Policy Period" shall mean the period lrom the Inception Date ol this Policy to Its Expirailcn Date as sel 
forth in Item 7 of the Declarations or its earlier termination date, if any. 
b) Insured 
"Insured" or "Insureds" shall mean 
1) The Named Insured as designated in Item 1 of the Declarations; 
2) Any par~er, executive ofllcer, director or employee of tile Named Insured while acting within"1he sc:ope 
-·-··--··-ol their dutlr~s ort bet,all .of .ll11: . .Named.lnsured; ________ ..................... ---··-·-······-- -·-·- . ·-• _. - · ---······-·····-· 
3) Any lorrner partner, executlve officer, director or employee ot the Named Insured \vhile acting within 
the scope of their duties on behall ot the Named Insured; 
4) The estate, the heirs, assigns or legal representatives in tile event of death or incompetency of arry 
individual Insured under this Polley. 






. . J 
c) Claim 
"Claim" shall mean a demand received by the Insured for compensation of damages, including the service 
al suit or institution of arbitraiion proceedings against the Insured. 
d) Loss 
"Loss" shall mean a monetary judgmert, award or settlemen1 lor damages including an a-,.-vard by a court 
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a party making Claim, but does no1 include fines, penalties or 
any matter uninsurable under the Law pursuant to which this Polley will be construed, nor the return ot tees 
or charges for the services rendered or to be rendered. 
e) Wrongful Act 
"Wrongful Act" shall mean any actual or alleged error or omission or breach o1 duly committed or alleged 
to have been committed or for failure to render such professional services as are customarily rendered In 
the profession of the IP.sured as stated in Item 3 of the Declarations. 
I) Cl~im Expenses 
"Claim Expenses" shall mean ( 1) fees charged by an attorney designated by the Company and (2) all other 
tees, costs or expenses incurred in the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of a Claim i1 incurred 
by the Company or an attorney designated cy the Corrpany, or by the Insureds with the written consent of 
the Company. However, "Claim Expenses" do not include salary charges of regular employees or officers 
of the Company nor salary or wages of the Insureds, nor any tees, cos1s, or expenses Incurred with respect 
to any criminal proceedings or _actions ~gainst an Insured. 
Ill. CLAIMS MADE EXTENSION CLAUSE 
If during the Policy Period, the Insured first becomes aware ot any specttic and identifiable Wrongful Act and 
during the Policy Period gives written notice to the Corrpany of: 
a) the· specific Wrongful Act; and 
b) the damage which has or may rE7sult from such Wrongful Act; and 
c) the circumstances by which the Insured first became aware of such Wronglul Act; 
then any Claim that Is subsequently made against the Insured arising ou1 of such Wrongful Act shall be 
deemed for the purposes of this insurance to have been made against the Insured during the Policy Period. 
IV. EXCLUSIONS 
Tfi1s Po11cy"aoes not apply either d1rec.'t1y or 1nclffecfly to any Cla1rn ancrClalm Expenses: 
a) Based upon or arising oul of any dishonest, criminal, fraudulent, malicious or inlentional Wrorigtul Acts, 
errors or omissions committed by or at the direction of the Insured. 
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b) For ilabllily arising out of the lnsured's services andior capacity as: 
1) an oHicer. director, partner, trustee, or employee oi a business enlerprise not named in the 
Dedaraiions or a charitable organiza1io11 or pension. weifare, pro1it sharing, muiual or investment tune 
or trust; 
2) a fiduciary under 1he Employee Retirement Income Socurity Act of 1974 and its arnendmams or any 
regulaHon or order issued pursuant thereto, or wilt1 respect lo any employee bonafit plan ot an Insured. 
c) Made by any business enterprise wr1lch is operated, managed or cwn0d, in whole or in part, by the Named 
lnsur2<J or the Named lnsured's parent cr.irnpany or any affiHat~d, subsidiary or associate company. 
d) Arising out of infringe,nent ot patent, copyright or 1rademarl<: 
e) For bodily injury, sickness, disease or death of any person, or for emotional distress, mental anguish, or 
other similar injury or damage, or any injury to, or destruction of, any tangible properly er loss of use 
resulting therefrom. 
t) Ar\sing out of false arres:, tiumiliation, dete11tion or imprisonment, wrongful entry or eviclior. or other 
invasion of private occupancy, or malicious prosecution, libel, slander or other defamatory or disparaging 
material, or a publication or an utterance in violation of an individual's right of privacy. 
g) Based upon or arising out of discrimination with respect to a violation of any municipal, State or Federal 
Civil Righ1s law, regulation or ordinance. 
h) Based upon or arising out of a violation or allogoo violation cf the Sec:uri!ies Act Of 1933 as amended, or 
the Securities Exchange Ac-~ of 1934 as amended, or any State Blue Sky or securities law or sirnilar state 
or Federal statute and any rogula!ioo or order issued pursuant to any of tha foregoing statutes, unless 
endorsed hereon. 
I) For the liability of otflers assumed by the Insured und\3, any oraJ or written cM!ract or agreement, unless 
such liability would have at!ached to Hie Insured even in 111$ absence of such agraemem. 
i) Based upon the lnsured's failure !o procure or maintain adequate insurance or bonds, or any Claim arising 
out of the lnsured's failure to r..ornply with any law with rsspect lo !he lnsured's employees concerning 
Workers' Compensation, Unemployrner.t Insurance, Social Security or Disability Benefits or any similar 
law. 
k) Based upon the Employee Retirement Income Se--.;urify Act ol 1974 or similar provisions ot any Federal, 
State or local statt.Jtory law or common law. · 
- - ----- -1) .fnr .. ac!t1al-Or-"'1i16ged.violatioA-Of-,ll~9--fiaGk8l08r-lnthJOf1GG<l-and-COf'.r.upt-Organi;rntion~-Act, . .:18-.U.S.C .. §. .. 196'1.- - . 
et seq., and any amendments th ereto, or any rules er regulations prom.ilgated thernunder. 
rn) Based upon assertions, allegations, causes of action or demands whatsoever by or on behalf of an insured 
or Insureds under this Policy agnin.,it a11other Insured or !n.sureds hereunder. 






n) Baseq upon the actual or alleged pertormance or the failure to perform by the Insureds any professional 
services· as an attorney, or the actual or alleged per1orrnance or failure to perform any professional 
services as an attorney by any person or entity retained or err,ployed by the Insureds. 
o) Due lo, based upon or arising out of, directly or indirect ly, resulting from or in consequence ct, or in any 
way involving seepage, pollution or contamination of any kind. · 
V. WAIVER OF EXCLUSIONS AND CONDITIONS 
Whenever coverage under any provision ot this Policy wou!d be excluded, suspended or lost: 
a} because of any exclusion relating to dishonest, criminal. fraudulent, mallcious or intentional Wrongful Acts 
or omissions by an Insured and with respeci to which any other Insured did not personally participate or 
personally acquiesce or remain passive alter having personal knowledge thereof: or 
b) becaust3 of non-compliance with any condition relating to giving of notice to the Company with respe0 to 
which any other Insured shall be In defauh, solely because ot lhe detault or concealment of the default by 
any other Insured responsible for the loss or damage otherwise insured hereunder; 
the Company agrees !hat such insurance as would otherwise be afforded under this Polley shall continue In 
effect with respect to each and every lnsureq who did not personally commit or personally acquiesce in or 
remain passive alter having personal knowledge ot one or more o1 the acts or omissions described in any such 
exclusion or condition; provided that if the condition be one with which such Insured can comply, after receiving 
knowledge thereof, the Insured entitled to the benefit of this Wa°Ner of Exclusions and Conditions shall comply 
with such condition promptly after obtaining knowledge of the failure of any other lnS1.Jred or employee to 
comply therewith. 
VI. LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
a) Deductible 
The Deductible amoulil stated in the Declarations shall be paid by the Insured and shall apply to each 
Claim and shall include Claim Expenses. 
b) Multiple Claims 
One or more Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Act or interrelated Wrongf~I Acts by 
one or more of the Insureds shall be considered a single Claim. 
c) Limit of Liability 
Subject to the foregoing, the Company's total llabllity for Loss including Claim Expenses resulting from all 
Claims lirstmade_againsLllle lnsurcds.rlliring the. P.clicy Period.shall nol exccc.d the amounl statedJn.the 
Declarations as "Limit of Liability," regardless o1 the time when such payment Is made. The Inclusion of 
more than one Insured hereunder shall not operate to either Increase the amount of the applicable 
Deductible nor the amount of tile Co~any's Urrit of Liability. The Limit of Liability shall be excess of !ha 
Deductible amount. 
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d) Exhaustion ol Limits of Liability 
The Company will not be liable to pay any Loss or Claim Expenses or continue the defense of any Claim, 
after the L!mil of Liability has been exhausted. 
e) Allocatlon o1 Claim Expenses 
In the event that any portion of a Claim does not come within the coverage afforded by this Polley, the 
Company shall be entitled to an allocation of Claim Expenses incurred on behalf or the Insureds based 
upon the ratio of the nurrber of counts, causes or action or allegations for which coverage Is afforded under 
this Policy as compared to the number or such counts, causes of action or allegations which are not within 
the scope of coverage. The Company shall not be required or obligated to pay that portion of Claim 
Expenses allocated to these counts, causes. ct action, or allegations which are not within the scope al 
coverage herein. 
VII. TERRITORY 
The insurance aHorded applies worldwide, provided that suit is brought or Claim is made within the United 
Stales. tts territories and possessions or Canada. 
VIII. CONDITIONS 
a) tnsured's Dulles In the Event of Claim, Arbitration or Sutt 
1) In the event of any Claim made against the Insured, written notice containing par1icurars sutticient to 
identify lhe jnsured and also reasonably obtainable int9rmatlon with respect to the time, place and 
circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses ot the injured and of available witnesses, shall 
be given by or tor the Insured to the firm named in Item 6 of the Declarations as soon as practicable. 
2) If the institution at arbttralion proceedings or suit Is brought against the Insured, the Insured shall 
Jmmediately forward to the firm named in Item 6 of the Declarations every demand, notice, summons 
or other process received by the Insured or his representative. 
b) Assistance and CooperaUon ot ttte Insured 
The Insured shall cooperate with the Company and its representatives and upon the Company's request 
shall submit to examination and interrogation by a representaUve of the Company, under oath if required, 
and shall altend hearings, depositions and trials and shall assist in effecting settlement, securing and 
giving evidence, obtaining the attendance at witnesses and in the conduct of suits, as well as in the givjng 
of a written statement or statements lo the Company's representatives and meeting with such 
representatives for the purpose of lnvestigalion and/or defense, all without cr.arge to ttie Company. The 
Insured shall fur1her cooperate with the Company and do whatever Is necessary to secure and effect any 
rights or indemnity, contribution or apportionment which the Insured may have. The Insured shall not, 
----- =xc:·epi··~t·-~. ~:.r-& .. ·,-,, GG;117"·i.,-t~1{t~· U":ry~~tii,¼1'!"'.:><ti¾ n,r~m:t- ~.-i7~H1.,~t1ttyt.aa+t~a-lf·-.1-}'1'· G :atn,u , ~-:.}:Ju.--m .. -·t1 :i y-~·!igQ~!',5~1 -c,-----
incur any expense without the written consent or the Company. 
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c) settlement of Claim 
The Compa'ny shall not settle any Claim without the consent of the Insured. If, however, the Insured shall 
refuse lo consent to any settlement recommended by the Company and shall elect to oontest the Claim or 
continue any legal proceedings in connection with such Claim, then the Compa·ny's liability for the Claim 
shall not exceed !he amount for which tile Clalm could have been so settled plus Claim Expenses incurred 
up to the date of such refusal. Such amounts are subject to the provisions of Clause VI, Umlts ot liability. 
d) Audit 
The Company may examine and audrt the lnsured's books and records at any lime during the Policy Period 
and after the final termination of this Polley, as far as they relate to the subject matter of this Polley. 
a) Subrogation 
In the event of any Claim or payment under this insurance. the Company shall be subrogated to the extent 
of such payment to all rights of recovery lheretor, and the Insureds shall execule all papers required and 
shall do everything that may be necessary to secure such rights. including !he exea.nion of such 
documents necessary lo enable the Company to elfeciively bring suit in the name of the Insureds. The 
Insureds shall do nothing after Claim is made against them to prejudice such rights. Any recovery shall 
first be paid to the Company to the extent of any Loss or Claim Expenses paid by the Company, with the 
balance paid to the Insured. However, no subrogation shall ~e had against any Insured unless such 
Insured is excluded from coverage by reason of Exclusion IV (a). 
f) O1.tler Insurance 
This Policy shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectable insurance availc!ble to the 
Insured whether such other insurance is staled to be primary, contributory, excess, contingent or 
otherwise, unless such other insurance is written only as a specific excess insurance over the Limit of 
Liability provided in this Policy. 
g) cancellation 
This Polley may be cancelled by the Named Insured by surrender thereof to the Company or by mailing 
written notice stating when thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. JI cancelled by the Insured, Iha 
Company shall retain the customary short ra1e proportion at the earned premium. This Policy may also be 
cancelled, with or without the return by tender of the unearned premium, by or on behalf of the Company 
by delivering to lhe Named Insured at the address set forth in tlhe Declarations or by sending to the Named 
Insured by mail, registered or unregistered, at the address in the Declarations not less than thirty (30) days 
(or ten (10) days in the event of non-payment ot premium) written notice stating when the cancellation shall 
be effective. If cancelled by the Company, the Company shall retain Iha pro rata portion of the e·arned 
premium. For the purpose ct this Polley, notice of cancellation given to the Named Insured by lhe 
Company or given to the Corr,pany by the Named Insured pursuant to this paragraph shall be deemed to 
be notice on behalf or all Insureds hereunder. 
If the period ot l'lmifalion relaling to the giving of notice 1s prohibited or made vold by any law controlling 
_ .the cons.1~r;c:tion liereot sl1Ch. periQ.d. st.Jal! Q.e_ deeme.d to be amended_lJo ~s _lg_ bE? eqt,Jal to_Jt1eJT)_inimym 
period of limitation permitted by such law. 
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h) Extension of Policy Period 
In the evenl of cancellation or non-renewal of this Policy in its entirety by the Company, this Policy may be 
extended for the additional period as indicated In Item 11 of the Declarations, for a premium based upon 
the percentage as indicated in Item· 12 of the Declarations 01 the total premium, for Claims first made 
against lhe Insured during the said extension period provided: 
1) The Wrongful Act giving rise to such Claim Is committed or alleged to have been committed prior to 
the effective date of the cancellation or the original expiration date, whichever is applicable, and which 
would be otherwise Insured by this Pc/icy; and 
2) Written notice ot the exercise of this option is given by the Named Insured in Item 1 ot the Declarations 
to the Company within ten (1 O) days after the effective date of cancellation or non-renewal; and 
-3) Such additional period shall be deemed part of the expiring Policy Period and not an add~ion there to; 
and 
4) For purposes of such additional period, coverage shall be applicable only with respect to Claims first 
made against the Insureds during such additional period. The provisions of Clause Ill ot this Policy 
shall not be applicable to such additional period. 
The quotation of a renewal premium higher than the expiring premium or a change in other terms or 
conditions shall not be deemed to be a cancellat"ton or non-renewal by the Company. 
i) Action Against the Company 
No actlon shall lie against the Company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been 
full compliance with all o1 the terms of this Policy, nor until the amount of the lnsured's obligation to pay 
shall have been finally determined ei1her by judgment against the Insured afler actual trial or by written 
agreement ot the Insured, the daimart and the Cofll)any. 
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment or written 
agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the exlent ol 1he insurance afforded 
by this Policy. No person or organization shall have any right under this Policy to join the Company as a 
party to any action against the Insured to determine the lnsured's Oability, nor shall the Company be 
impleaded by the Insured or his legal representatlve. Bankruptcy or insolvency at the Insured or ot the 
tnsured's estate shall not relieve the Company of any of its obligations hereunder. 
j) Assignment 
No assignment of interest under this Policy shall bind lhe Company unless its prior written consent is 
erdorsed hereon. 
k) Changes 
---- -----,Notn.:e to or kiiowlifdgs "possessed by any age1ircJroy<li'iy 0'1ffeqrnnr:in-srra,t-rra~ e:,~r:r-a-warv.;r0,·:, 
change in any part of this Polley, nor estop the Company from asserting any•righl$ undhr ~h~ Jecms of this 
Policy. The terms ot this Policy shall not be waived or changed, except by endo,~errp;,1~Jssued to form a 
part ot this Policy, signed by an authorized representative of the Comp3D\i) · .. ,:. · 







>0 : 1 By acceptance of this Policy, the Insureds agree that the statements in the application are personal 
representations, that they shall be deemed material and that this Policy is issued in reliance upon the truth 
of such representations and that this Policy embodies all agreements existing between the Insureds and 
the Company or any of their agents reiatlng to this insurance. 
m) False ot Fraudulent Claims 
II any Insured shall commit fraud In proffering any Claim as regards amount or otherwise, this insurance 
shall become void as to such Insured irom the date such fraudulent Claim Is proffered. 




NAMED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al 
NAMED INSURE0'S PROFSSSIONAL DESCRIPTION ENDORSEMENT 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood 
and agreed that Item 3 of the Declarations, the " Named Insured's 
Profession", shall read as follows: 
3. Named Insured's Profession: 
Solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker 
of non- owned properties, for others for a fee. 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged. 
Endorsement effective: 11/26/07 HMP Policy No . H707 -16865 
Endorsement No. 1 
Professional , Inde~n ity Agency, Inc . 
by . 
(Autho rized Representat i ve) 
HMP E-32 







Named Insured : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et al 
NUCLEAR H!CIDENT EXCLUSION CLAUSE- LIABILITY- DIRECT (BROAD) 
In consideration of the premium charged , it is understood and agreed 
that this Policy of Insurance does not apply : 
I. Under any Liability Coverage, to injury, sickness , disease, death 
or destruction 
(a) with respect to which an insured under the policy is also an 
insured under a nuclear energy liabil i ty policy issued by 
Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association, Mutual Atomic 
Energy Liability Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance Association 
of Canada, or would be an insured under any such policy but 
for i t s termination upon exhaustion of its limit of liability; 
o r 
(b) resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear materia l 
and with respect to which (1) any person or organization is 
required to maintain f inancial p r otection pursuant to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or any law amendatory thereof, or 
(2) the insured is, or had this policy not been issued would 
be, entitled to indemnity from the United States of America , 
or any agency thereof , under any agreement entered into by the 
United States of America, or any agency thereof, with any 
person or.organization . 
II. Under any Medical Payments Coverage , or under any Supplementary 
Payments Provision relating to immediate medical or surgical 
relief, to expenses incurred wi t h respect to bodily injury, 
sickness, disease or death resulting from the hazardous 
properties of nuclear material and arising out of the oper ation 
of a nuclear facility by any person er organization . 
III . Under any Liability Coverage, to injury, sickness, disease , death 
or destruction resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear 
material, if 
(a) the nuclear material (1) is at any nuclear faci lity owned by, 
or operated by er on beha l f of, any insured or (2) has been 
discharged or dispersed therefrom; 
(b) the nuclear material is contained in spent fuel or waste at 
any time possessed, handled, used, processed , stored , 
transported or disposed of by or on behalf of an insured; or 
- ---- - ,(--e-t-+:-f:-e-i-f-:--1+.H~.:t,--ci-:-~e-k-F. ·:. ~~J-:i·--·~...:-:--- --- ,---c! e .:, .. l:--f::--:::, r--- --,:.J'::!•:=· t=..-r;.,t:~•:..:4~i -:=.,.r!---=:--1:·-:t-:=-•,=:, :.i-~i::_1-1=-: ----
of the furnishing by an insured of servi ces , materials, parts 
or equipment in connection with the planning , construction, 
maintenance, operation or use of any nuclear faci lity, but if 
such facility is located within the Uni ted States of America, 
its territories or possessions or Canada , this excl usion (c) 




NUCLEAR INCIDENT EXCLUSION, Continued Page 2 of 2 
IV . As used in this endorsement : 
" hazardous properties" include radioactive, toxic or explosive 
properties; "nuclear material" means source material, special nuclear 
material er: byp.roduct material ; "source material", " special nuclear 
material" , and "byproduct material" have the meanings given them in 
the Atomic Energy Act 1954 or in any law amendatory thereof; "spent 
fuel'' means any fuel element or fuel component , solid or liquid, which 
has been used or exposed to radiation in a nuclear reactor; "waste " 
means any waste material (1) containing bypr oduct material and (2) 
resulting from the operation by any person or organization of any 
nucl ear faci l ity included within the definition of nuclear facility 
under paragraph (a) or (b ) thereof;"nuclear facility" mea n s 
(a) any nuclear reactor; 
(b) any equipment or device designed or used for (1) separating 
the isotopes of uranium or plutonium, ( 2) processing or 
utilizing spent fuel , or (3) handling, processing or packaging 
waste ; 
(c) any equipment or device used for the processing, fabricating 
or alloying of special nuclear material if at any time the 
total amount of such material in the custody of the insured at 
the premises where such equipment or device is located 
consists of or contains more than 25 g.r.ams of plutonium or 
uranium 233 or any combination thereof, or more than 250 grams 
of uranium 235 ; 
(d) any structure, basin, excavation , premises or place prepared 
or used for the storage or disposal of waste; 
and includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all 
operations conducted on such site and all premises used for such 
operations; " nuclear reactor" means any apparatus designed or used to 
sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction or to 
contain a critical mass of fissionable material . With respect to 
injury to or destruction of property, t h e word "injury" or 
"destruction" includes all forms of radioactive contamination of 
property . 
It is understood and agreed that , except as specifically provided in 
the forego-1.ng to the contrary, this clause is subject to the terms, 
exclusions , conditions and limitations of the Certificate of Insurance 
to which it is attached. 
It is further understood and agreed that this Policy has a 25% 
minimum earned premium condition . 
. ". ' 1 ·~ the ~- ti:: ~'H.S-a-n ~! ·: ::, r,.,:,i-:i:-~l➔H-S-r ~:·ii ·,.:i,-H- u r: ::hi>-·R ..-E~reE·:1-1 :--- -- ----- - - -------
Endorsement effective 11/26/07 
Endorsement No . 2 
HMI? E-4 6 
E46 
HMP Policy No . H707-16865 
l?rofess i /j;;i l :.1.-:lemni ty Agency, Inc. 
lt .. , ~- ;;J 
t.' ,Vf ... / by __ ..:., ·. ~,';-, , 





NAYIED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC OBA: et al 
In consideration of the premicm charged , it is he ceby understood and 
agreed the section of t:he Policy entitled "II . Defi:-iitions, 
part e) , Wrongful Act" , is a mended to include the following: 
With respect t o the Insured ' s profession as sta ted in Item 3 of the 
Declarations , WRONGFUL ACT shall also mean any actual or alleged : 
1. Libel , sl ander or other forms of defamation ; 
2 . I~vasion or infringement of the right of privacy or publicity; 
3 . Plagiarism, piracy or misappropriation of ideas under implied 
contract . 
It is also understood and agreed that Exclusion "f" of this Policy 
is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
fl to a ny claim and claim expenses arising out of (1) false arrest , 
detention or imprisonment ; (2) wrongful entry or evictions , or 
invasion of any right of private occupancy . 
It is furthe r understood and agreed that this Policy does not 
apply : 
1. to any clai~ and claim expenses arising out of or connected 
with the performance of or failure to perform services as an 
insurance agen t , insurance broker, mo rtgage banker, mortgage 
broker, escrow agent, property developer , builder, construction 
manager: , or property manager; 
2. to any claim and claim expenses arising out of any Insured 
~aking warranties or guarantees as to any future value of any 
property; 
3 . to any claim and claim expenses ar i sing out of notarized 
certification o= acknowledgement of a signature without the 
physical appearance at the tine of said notarization before 
such notary public as insured hereunder of the person who is or 
claims to be the person signing; 
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4 . to any claim and claim expenses arising out of or connected 
with any transaction in which any Insured has a direct or 
indirect beneficial ownership interest as a buyer or seller of 
real property; however, this exclusion does not apply to re-al 
property to which any Insured has taken legal title solely for 
immediate r esale and has entered into a written contract to 
sel l not later than ninety (90) days after taking legal title ; 
5 . to any claim and claim expenses arising out of or connected 
with the formulation, pr·omotion, syndication, offer, sale or 
management of any limited or general partnership or any inter-
est therein. 
All other te r ms and conditions remai n unchanged . 
Endorsement effective 11/26/07 HMP Policy No . H707 - 16865 
Endorsement No. 3 
Professional Indemnity Agency, Inc. 
HMP E- 17 
by 
(~uthor lU~d Repre sentative ) 







NA.~ED INSURED : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC OBA: et a l 
ORGANIC GROWTHS EXCLUSIONARY ENDORSEMENT 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood and 
agreed that this Policy s hall not apply to and no coverage will 
be afforded for any Claim, including any Loss or Claim Expenses , 
which, either in whole or in part , directly or indirectly, is for , 
based upon, relates to , or arises out of the formation, growth , 
presence, release , dispersal , containment , removal, testing for , 
or detection or monitoring of any molds, fungi, spores, or other 
similar growths or organic matter, including but not limited to 
aspergillus , penicillium, or any strain or type of Stachybotris , 
commonly collectively referr ed to as the "Black Molds ". 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged. 
Endorsement effective 11/26/07 HMP Policy No . H707 -16865 
Endorsement No . 4 





by_----, __ .._;--c---=------,-----,,----c--{ Author i t~ d Represen tativ e) 
·- -·· ··"·"-·--------·----- . --··-------·---
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NAMED INSURED : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et a l 
In consideration of the premium charged , it is hereby understood 
and agreed that coverage afforded by this Policy i s hereby extended 
to provide property damage arising from the use and ope~ation 
of a lock box . A $25,000 sublimit shall apply for the lock box 
coverage afforded in this endorsement . This sublimit of liability 
is part of and not in addition to the limit of liability stated in 
Item #4 of the Declaration Page . 
It is further understood and agreed that the section of this Po l icy 
entitled " IV . EXCLUSIONS, part o) " shall net apply to claims based 
upon or arising cut of Wrongful Acts invol ving the Insured ' s 
failure to disclose the existence of pol lutants. A sublimit 
of Liability of $500,000 in the aggregate shall apply to 
this coverage . This sublimit of liability is part of and not. 
in addition to the limit of liability stated in Item #4 of the 
Declaration Page . 
It is further understood and agreed that the Independent Contractors, 
of the "Named I nsured" , are covered solely for their Professional 
Services provided on behalf of the Insured; but only if the 
Professional Services of the Independent Contractor(s) are the same 
as those set forth in Item 3 of the Declarations Page and in 
Endorsement No . 1 of this Policy . 
It is further understood and agreed that exclusion g), of this 
Pol i cy is deleted in its entirety , solely with regards to civil law 
suits that seek monetary damages . These civil law suits cannot be 
brought by er on behalf of any cur rent or former partner , executive 
officer , director or employee of the Named Insured. 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged . 
Endorsement Effective : 11 /26/07 Policy No . : H707 - 16865 
Endorsement No . : 5 
2rofessh'ln;~1l J.nqemn.ity Agency, Inc . 
··.•~}·/./ 
by ··-·---····(···A;,;···u·····t h.o ... r;.,-:-- ed 
.L.: RepresenFat.IveY 
HM!? E- 161 








NF~ED INSURED: UTA~ COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et al 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood 
and agreed that the section of this Policy Titled "VIII . 
CONDITIONS", part h) , Extension of Policy Period is deleted 
in ir.s entirety and replaced with the following: 
h) Extension of Policy Period 
In the event of cancellation or non- renewal of this Policy in 
its entirety by the Company or the Insured , this Policy may be 
extended fer the additional period as indicated in Item 11 of the 
Schedule, for a premium based upon the percentage as indicated in 
I~em 12 of the Declarations of the total premium, fer Claims first 
made against the Insured during the said extension period provided : 
1) The Wrong=ul Act giving rise tc such Claim is committed or alleged 
to have been committed prior to the effective date of the cancel -
lation or the original expiration date, whichever is applicable, 
and which would be otherwise insured by this Policy; and 
2) Written notice o: the exercise of this option is given by the 
Named Insured in Item 1 of the Declarations to the Company within 
ten (10) days after the effective date of cancellation or non-
renewal; and 
3) Such additional period shall be deemed part of the expiring 
Policy Period and not an addition thereto ; and 
4) ?or p u r~ose s of such additional period, coverage shall be applicable 
only with respect to Claims first ~ade agai~st the Insureds during 
such additional period. The provisions of Clause III of this 
Policy shall not be applicable to such additional period; and 
5) The limit of liability applicable to the Extended Discovery Period 
shall be or-ly the remaining limit cf liability available under 
the Policy and no additional limit of liability shall be 
applicable; and 
The quotation cf a renewal premium higher than the expiring premium 
or a change in other terms or conditions shall not be deemed to be 
a cancellation or non- renewal by the Company . 
All ether terms and conditions remain unchanged . 
Endorsement effective 11/26/07 
HM2 E- 133 
£133 
Endorsement No. 6 
HMP Policy No . H707 -16865 
Pro=essi .:-1i al Ir1?em1:i ty Agency, Inc. 
' ., ' . ' - .. 
by ___ _;_ _ _______ _ 
(Authori zed Representative) 
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NAMED INSURED : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood 
and agreed that this Policy shall not apply to and coverage shall 
not be afforded for any Claim and Claim Expenses based upon or 
arising out of the sale, management, lease or rental of any Real 
estate located in the state of California . 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged . 
Endorsement effective 11/26/07 HMP Policy No . H707-16865 
Endorsement No . 7 .. , 
! ' 
HMP E- 166 







NA.MED INSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC OBA : et al 
PENDING/?RIOR LITIGATION ENDORSEMENT 
In consideration of the premiu~ charged , it is hereby understood and 
agreed that this Policy excludes all claims and claim expenses 
arising from all pending or prior litigation, as well as future claims 
arising out of said pending or prior litigations . 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged . 
E~dorsement effective 11/26/07 
Endorsement No . 8 
HMP E- 34 
E34 
HMP Policy No. H707 - 16865 
Professional Indemnity Agency, Inc . 
. . .,.,. 
by ___ ___________ _ 
(Authod zed Representative) 
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NAME',D INSURSO : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al 
Sl~RVICE OF SUIT CLAUSE 
As used in this endors ement, the "Company" refers to Houston Casualty 
Company . 
This applies in jurisdictions where the Company is not an admitted 
insurer. 
It is agreed that in the event of the Company's failure to pay the 
amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Company, at the request o f the 
Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent 
jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all 
requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction and all matters 
arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and 
practice of such court . 
It is further agreed that, pursuant to any statute of any state, 
territory or district of the United States which makes provision 
therefore, the Company hereby designates the Superintendent, 
Commissioner or D1rector of Insurance or other officer specified for 
that purpose in the statute, or his successor or successors in office, 
as its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served any lawful 
process in any action, suit or proceeding instituted by or on behalf 
of the Insured or any benefici ary hereunder arising out of this policy 
of insurance, and hereby designates the President of the Houston 
Casualty Company in care of the General Counsel, at 13403 Northwest 
Freeway , Houston, TX , 77040, as the person to whom the said 
officer is authori zed t o mail such process or true copy thereof . 
It is further understood and agreed tha t service of process in such 
E,ui t may be made upon JAY SIM.MONS , Attorney-In-Fact , at 
13403 Northwest Freeway, Houston , TX, 77040 , and that in any suit 
i nstituted against any one of them upon this contract , Underwriters 
will abide by the final decision of such Court or of any Appellate 
Court in . the event of an appeal. 
Al l other terms and conditions remain unchanged . 
Endorsement Effective : 11/26/07 Policy No .: H707-16865 
Endcrsement No . : 9 










NJlJ1ED I NSURED: UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et al 
In consid e ration of the premium charged , it is hereby understood 
and agreed that a Retroactive Date of 11/01/05 in lieu of 8/01/01 
shal l apply to the following Named Insured : 
PRUDENTIAL CRES COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
All other terms and condit i ons remain unchanged. 
Endorsement effective: 11/26/07 
Endorsement No .: 10 
HMP Policy No . : H707 - 16865 
Professi9 al Indemnity Agency, Inc . 
by 
(Autho rized Represr= r:tativc ) 
HMP E-53 
___ ,_,,. ______ . ··· - ··-·· ·- ····· ······---· --------
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NAMED I NSURED ; UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al 
In consideration of the premium charged it is hereby understood and 
agreed that Section IV. EXCLUSIONS is amended to include the 
following: 
This Policy does not apply to and the Company shall not be liable for 
Damages and/or Claims Expenses resulting from any claim made against 
the Insured : 
P . for, based upon, or arising from any alleged unsolicited sending 
of information by fax , electronic mail (e- mail), or via any other 
means where prohibited by law. 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged. 
Endorsement effective : 11/26/07 
Endorsement No . : 11 
Policy No . : H707-16865 
Professional. Indemnity Agency, Inc . 
by: 
(Authori zed Representative) 
HMP E-174 







NAMED INSURED : UTAH COUNTY REAL CSTATE, LLC OBA : et al 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood 
and agreed thac Section VI. LIMITS OF LIABILITY is amended to 
include the following : 
f) Supplemental Payment s 
The Company will pay ~he reasonable expenses incurred , including 
actual and provable loss of waqes , if the Insured is required by 
:he Compar.y t o attend proceedings or trial in the defense of a 
covered Claim . Such payments are subjec t to the f ollowing : 
1 ) The maximum reimbursement for such expenses shall not exceed 
$250 per day f or each Insured who attends such proceedings at 
t he Company ' s reques t ; 
2) The Company ' s max i mum total liabi l ity f or reimburs ement shall 
not exceed $5, 000 per Claim regardless of t he n umber of 
I n sureds who attend such proceedings at the Compan y ' s 
request; and 
3) Such payments shall be par t of and shall reduce the available 
Limit of Liability . 
Solely for t h e purposes of this Endo rseme n t , t h e Deducti ble amoun t 
applicable co each Claim shall not apply to the supplemental 
payments made by the Company under this subsection of the Policy . 
All other terms and conc'ii:.ions remain uncha nged . 
Endorsement Effective : 11/26/07 Pol~cy No . : H~07 - l6865 
Endorsement No . : 12 
Profession,¥1 Indernni ty Agency, I n c . 
by 
( AuthorV' ed Rep r e s ·en : . .:iti·v·c,n· 
HMP E- 192 
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NAMED INSURED : UT.AH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC DBA : et al 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood 
and agreed that Section II . DEFINITIONS, pai:-t b), is amended to 
include the following : 
5) The lawful spouse of an Insured (as set forth in items 1 - 4 
above) in any Claims made against such spouse solely by reason 
of spousal status or ownership interest in marital property/ 
asset s that are sought as recovery for such Claim, but only if 
Claim does not allege any Wrongful Act or omission by such 
spouse . 
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged . 
Endorsement Effective : 11/26/07 
Endorsement No.: 13 
Policy No .: H707 - 16865 
Profe:3s : ,· i· , l Indemn:i.ty Agency, Inc . 
by 
(Authoi/.1. zed Represent.at:~) 
HMP E: - 193 





APPLICATION FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE 
IF COVERAGE lS ISSUED, fT WILL SE ON A CLAIMS-MADE BASIS 
NOTICE: THIS INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDES THAT THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY AVAJLABLE TO PAY 
JUDGEMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS SHALL BE REDUCED BY AMOUNTS INCURRED FOR LEGAL DEFENSE. 
FURTHER NOTE THAT AMOUNTS !l'JCURRED FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SHALL BE APPLIED AG.O.INST TKE 
DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT. 
c/ 6-q /7,,-~,,.,-'"''"" ;c( t't!W, J,,.,.-i,L 6,:.64,f:_ 
1. NAME OF APPLICANT: Jj/.-,J, , ,·,c1,,?,_ >0d' °&.,6..i.t:.~ i.!{ ./ {,!:i_/.:.~,_,:.t/,c_{_ ,:.•,i~:,;_..?,_,tt.1_,,,:!ieLitL/2?? ~~ 
ADDRESS: 




S1 ,000,000 ✓ 
$10,C00 __ _ 
$2,000,000 - - -
$25,000 __ _ 
4. Pleas6 describe in detail the professional activilies for which coverage is desired: 
Other ____ _ 
Other ____ _ 
---'-=f.'. r:• z.~~( &.!.l.l.a.l ..Lf-c·,,, e;-·, · ,••,:'.r-1.L.L.r.1.at:!._ C2t•-;•1Y (u.5,:.,:'/2=•-:.;;':."-'_,.. """':,;;-<"'J;ec.__ __ __ _ 
5. Is the appllcan1 engaged In any business or profession other than as described in Item 4? t?'z, 
If yes, p lease at tach an explanation and estimated revenues. 
6 Lisi lhe total gross ;evenues for the past two years derived from those activities in Question 4. In addition, 
pleAse list projected rt'lvenues for the curr~nt year. 
a I Current Projected 
b) _ZL:OG._ 
t,1PL 10190 
Page 1 of 4 
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7. For the revenues listed in question 6a), please give the approximate percentage derived from each oi the 
activities listed in Question 4: · 
ACTIVITY % OF 6a) REVENUES 
JI[, % 
1¥ % 
_ _ __ % 
____ % 
8 . Applicant is: Corporation __ Partnership _ _ L-l.f:.~ Individual 
9. Year Established: __ _,!.:c.··.c-:r,,:.·'·'-'-'--· '-/ ____ _ 
10. Is the Applicant Firm controlled, owned or associa1ed with any other firm, corporation or company? 
YES_:::_No _ _ . If yes, attach an explanation. Ara any activities listed In Question 4 provided to such 
business enterprise? YES _ _ NO~ 
,P,4'.,-;--M.6'4/ k-ct G;kk TrJ,MM.u'¢( !,'.!!rn'a<-,:.; pf' .~r/cP,1 ~c- <P~ $ 
'I/./% of f4 l!, t..t. C 
11. a) Number of pr1nclpals, partners. officers and professional employees direcily engaged in providing 
services to clients: 2-?c:, 
---
b) Number of non-professional employees (clerks, secretaries, etc.): 
12. Please provide the following: 





.. . lit:t:.-~P.·r:. _ . 
DATE 
QUALIFIED 
13. To what protessionai associallon(s) does the Applicant Firm belong? 
HOW LONG IN 
PRACTICE 
_ _/_z. l'.~ -
HOW LONG AS 
PARTNER/ 
PRINCIPAL 
tt/a4 ('::"-'. z~3/-tf"ifi £Y:-h:.6'b:l_J!~!?.('"'21'"$ ___ . - ·- - ·-- - - - -







14 Please include a list of Applicant Firm's five (5) largest jobs or projects during the past three (3} years. Please 
give, in detail: 1) project/client name; 2} the nature of the services performed for the client; and 3) 1he 
revenues obtained from those services. 
I I, '1 ?£:, S ':,.{) 3 7?, ?./f 
I,;:,:,,,.-, ,.q.,.r./.·/ Gi' .;;9.· t?,;:_;;:_1~/,.;•;:,, u.0 .~-'-· - - -?~Y f!!+.!d.9-,~ ~Ll..c.1:1:!,~c-l ___ J._t ~•-t_~-;k7 ta·,;; ?..C/P, (:,,!:p 
.. -fe: ,,,~_i..,_f ,-h·,·1 · , l !."'•,_; /de,:;1..i.i>:il -'i.:..r:.13.:l.~----..L!u~ao / "'-'-'"'-'-...L..-- - - - - ----- -'-="'---''--'-' '-'- -----"' 
15. Does the Applicant Firm use a written contract with client? 
_L In all cases ___ Sometimes 
16. 
Never 
Please attach a copy of your standard contract(s}. 
What percentage of the Appl!cant Firm's business Involves subcontracting of work to others? __ %. Does 
the Applicant Firm provide professional services to business entitles in which 1  retains an ownership interest 
Yes No __L. If yes, please explain. 
--------------------·-------- -
- - ----- -- -· --- -
-------- ---- --
17. Has any similar insurance ever been declined or cancelled? Yes ....L_ (lf yes, attach explanation.) No __ . 
C'~ceel-cd FJv- le-~? k/i;~ ~r ,Pd.'/.ect'<F'!;Ur 1;cl'~✓e./ &P#t ~,.-1 _,q?/r""'y: 
18. Is similar Insurance currently in fores? Yes~ No __ 
If yes, please provide: 
Description of services being covered: 
Expiration Daie: //...-Z4 =-C~' ..... 7 _ _ _ _ _ Prior Acls/Aelro. Date: _ _ Yd~-- _ _ _ _ 
Deductible: $ __ 25L..Q/.ZQ __ 
Length ot time coverai:ie has been In force: _._S_jt~ae'!, 
Premium:$ ____ , ____ _ 
19. Anach most recent aud1leo iin.;ncial statemen1s (or recent lax returns) and descriptive or promotional rnatarials. 
{B) Estimated Cost ol Goods Sold lor current fiscal period· $_[5_,_~ 'f;O,.. ~ - -
Page 3 of 4 
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20. Have any of the individuals listed in question No. 12 ever been the sucject of'disciplinary action by authorities 
as a resutt of their professlonal activities? Yes _ _ No .....:.!::C_ If yes, please explain. 
- ··-· ···------·----··----··-·--···----- - .. - --------- -·-
-------··--·-· 
21. Does any person to be Insured have knowledge or information ot any act, error or omissi.on which might 
reasonably be expected to give rise to a claim against him/her. YES __ NO~ If yes, please complete 
a Supplemental Claim lnfonnation fonn for each. 
22. After Inquiry have any claims been made against any proposed lnsured(s) during the past three (3) years? 
Yes _L__ No ___ If yes, please complete a supplemental Claims Information form lor each claim. 
Also. how many claims have been made in the last three (3) years? ~~~d/.~~(£ __ 
It is understood and agreed that with respect to questions 20, 21 and 22 above, that if such knowledge or 
information exists <1ny claim or action arising therefrom ls excluded from this proposed coverage. 
NOTICE TO NEW YORK APPLICANTS: ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY ANO WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD 
ANY INSURANCE COMPANY OR OTHER PERSON FILES AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE CONTAINING 
ANY FALSE INFORMATION, OR CONCEALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MISLEADING, INFORMATION CONCERN• 
ING ANY FACT MATERIAL THERETO, COMMITS A FRAUDULENT INSURANCE ACT, WHICH IS A CRIME. 
The Applicant hereby acknowledges that he/she/it is aware that the limit of liability shall be reduced, and may 
ba completely exhausted, by the costs of legal defense and, ln such even!, the Insurer shall not be liable for the 
costs of legal defense or for the amount or any judgemnnt or settlement to the extent that such exceeds the limit 
of liability. 
The Appllcant hereby turther acknowledges that he/she/it is aware that legal detense costs that are incurred shall 
be applied against the deductible amount. 
I HEREBY DECLARE that, alter inquiry, the above statements and particulars are true and I have not suppressoo 
or misstated any material fact and that I agree that this application shall be the basis o! the contract with the 
Underwriters . 
.. }ig~a,~ .re of p~-~on authorized to execute on behalf ol the Applicant: 
., ~0·-·· ..:::.-Ft~ · r ,~, . .. , ·· · .---~ Till ;;- -I .. ,.. .• ~:?.?_?;!'?), .i.;..--:-_________ 8 ,&(1?'11...13.S, ~·it Date _____ ~.Z.f-07----
\ (, ! 
'i1;,:;-Kpplicalion Form duly completed, together with any supplemenlary information, must be signe:.! in ink by Iha 
person indicated. 
Signing oi this lorm do~s 110 1 tJi11d the Applicant or the Ur1c.Jerw111~rs to complete the insuranca. 
TJ-:iI$_AP.ELLQATION MW.ST B~ SUBl'\!11:rT~lQ; 
, ·:·iOFESSIONAL INDEMNIU i:,.:;;:r-:(;'/, INC. 
~'Y(lt:i=SSIONAL INDEMNITY Af:,,.:,,1r.Y. INC OF N.Y. 
37 Radio Circ;le Drive· P.O. Bo~ 5000 
Mount Kisco, New York 10549-5000 
Allantion: Edward D. Donnelly, CPCU 
Page 4ol4 
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